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OBSCENITY:

A NEW DIRECTION IN REGULATION

In 1957 the Supreme Court announced that "obscenity is not
within the area of protected speech or press.", While the Court
refused to extend constitutional protection to obscenity, it failed
to :provide a necessary standard which would separate protected
from unprotected speech. The litigation which ensued created a
virtual arena of dilemma for the lower courts which were forced
to apply incomprehensible definitions of obscenity and rigid procedural requirements mandated by the Supreme Court. In an
era of increasing social awareness, with a clamoring for the
preservation of individual freedom, Stanley v. Georgia, re-examined for the first time the constitutional prohibition and extended
First Amendment protection to obscene materials in the privacy
of an individual's home.
This comment examines the development of obscenity regulation in the United States in light of the First Amendment and
the Stanley doctrine.3 In addition this comment reviews recent
decisions in order to propose a multi-step method of judicial decision-making which would avoid the pitfalls of today's inadequate system of censorship.
FIRST AMENDMENT PROTECTION

That "Congress shall make no law.., abridging the freedom
of speech or of the press" is established by the First Amendment.4 Although this choice of words gives every appearance
that the framers of this mandate sought to protect the expression of all the beliefs, thoughts, and ideas of the American citizenry, 5 the majority of the Supreme Court in Roth v. United
1 Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 485 (1957).
2 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
3

4

See text accompanying notes 178 through 238 infra.
U.S. CONST. amend. I.

5 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting). James Madison, in exploring the sweep of the First Amendment's limitation on the Federal Government, when he offered the Bill of
Rights to Congress in 1789, is reported as having said, "It]he right of
freedom of speech is secured; the liberty of the press is expressly declared
to be beyond the reach of this Government. . . ." (Emphasis added.)
1
Annals of Cong. 738. For reports of other discussions by Mr. Madison
see pp. 424-49, 660, 704-56. Eleven years later he wrote: "[w]ithout tracing
farther the evidence on this subject, it would seem scarcely possible to doubt
that no power whatever over the press was supposed to be delegated by the
Constitution, as it originally stood, and that the amendment was intended
as a positive and absolute reservation of it." 6 J. MADISON, WRITINrs 341,
391 (Hunt ed. 1906), and see generally 385-93, 399.
Thomas Jefferson's views of the breadth of the First Amendment's
prohibition against abridgment of speech and press by the Federal Government are illustrated by the following statement he made in 1798:
[The First Amendment] thereby guard[s] in the same sentence, and
under the same words, the freedom of religion, of speech, and of the
press: insomuch, that whatever violates either, throws down the sanctuary which covers the others, and that libels, falsehood, and defamation,

19711

Obscenity Regulation

States,6 held obscenity not to be speech entitled to this constitutional protection. The majority, per Justice Brennan, found that
although this phraseology is unconditional, the First Amendment
was not intended to protect every utterance.7 Although it is settled constitutional doctrine that the dissemination of protected
"speech" may ordinarily be prohibited only where there is a
"clear and present danger" of resulting anti-social behavior,8 the
majority in Roth did not find it necessary to apply this standard.
They, instead, found that there was sufficient contemporary evidence to show that obscenity, at the time of the enactment of the
First Amendment, was outside the protection intended for speech
and press,9 since it is utterly without redeeming social importance. 10 This the Court noted, was "reflected in the international
agreement of over 50 nations, in the obscenity laws of all the 48
States, and in the 20 obscenity laws enacted by Congress from
1842 to 1956." 11
The Justices of the Supreme Court, in addition to legal scholars, have repeatedly remained divided as to the breadth of the
First Amendment. Rarely has a majority of the Court agreed
in the reasoning used to arrive at a decision. 12 Instead they have
expressed their own views in separate concurring or dissenting
opinions. 18
Two Justices, Douglas and Black, have consistently adhered
to the view that the First Amendment is absolute; that any expression of ideas, even if not in accord with contemporary comequally with heresy and false religion, are withheld from the cognizance

of federal tribunals.
8 T. JEFFERSON, WRITINGS 464-65 (Ford ed. 1904).

For another early
discussion of the scope of the First Amendment as a complete bar to all
federal abridgment of speech and press see St. George Tucker's comments
on the adequacy of state forums and state laws to grant all the protection
needed against defamation and libel. 1 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 299
(Tucker ed. 1803).
6 354 U.S. 476 (1957). See also Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S.
568, 571-72 (1941), expressing the same interpretation.
7 354 U.S. at 483.
8E.g., Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951) ; Schenck v. United
States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
9 354 U.S. at 483.
10 Id. at 484.
11Id. at 485-86.
12 Mishkin v. New York, 383 U.S. 502 (1968)
is the sole case since Roth
in which a majority of the Court has agreed in one opinion. See note 51
infra.
ia See Hoyt v. Minnesota, 399 U.S. 524 (1970)
for opinions of Justices
Blackmun, Burger and Harlan; Walker v. Ohio, 398 U.S. 434 (1970) for
an opinion by Chief Justice Burger; Stanley v. Georgia, 384 U.S. 557 (1969)
in which Justice Marshall wrote the opinion of the Court; Memoirs v.
Massachusetts 383 U.S. 413 (1966) for opinions by Justices Brennan,
Warren and l'ortas, a separate opinion by Justice Harlan, and another by
Justice Clark and one by Justice White; Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184
(1964) for opinions by Justices Brennan and Goldberg, one by Justice
Stewart, one by Justices Warren and Clark, and another by Justice Harlan.
See text accompanying notes 14 through 22 infra.
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munity standards, is within the ambit of constitutional protection. 14 Therefore, they hold that a state is constitutionally without power to supress, control or punish the distributor of any
writing upon the grounds that it is obscene. 15 Justice Stewart
has held that no constitutional protection is extended to obscenity
14 Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957)
(Douglas and Black, JJ.,
dissenting) :
When speech alone is involved, I do not think that government, consistently with the First Amendment, can become the sponsor of any . . .
movements [liberal or Victorian]. I do not think that government, consistently with the First Amendment, can throw its weight behind one
school or another. Government should be concerned with antisocial
conduct, not with utterances. Thus, if the First Amendment guarantee
of freedom of speech and press is to mean anything in this field, it must
allow protests even against the moral code that the standard of the day
sets for the community. In other words, literature should not be suppressed merely because it offends the moral code of the censor.
Id. at 512-13.
15 Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147 (1959)
(Black, J., concurring):
Certainly the First Amendment's language leaves no room for inference
that abridgments of speech and press can be made just because they are
slight. That Amendment provides, in simple words, that 'Congress shall
make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press.' I
read 'no law . . . abridging' to mean no law abridging. The First
Amendment, which is the supreme law of the land, has thus fixed its own
value on freedom of speech and press by putting these freedoms wholly
'beyond the reach' of federal power to abridge. No other provision of
the Constitution purports to dilute the scope of these unequivocal
commands of the First Amendment. Consequently, I do not believe that
any federal agencies, including Congress and this Court, have power or
authority to subordinate speech and press to what they think are 'more
important interests.' The contrary notion is, in my judgment, courtmade, not Constitution-made.
Id. at 157-59.
Justice Douglas, a foe of all obscenity regulations, stated his position
most ferociously in Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463 (1966) (Douglas,
J., dissenting) :
[T]he First Amendment allows all ideas to be expressed - whether
orthodox, popular, offbeat, or repulsive. I do not think it permissible to
draw lines between the 'good' and the 'bad' and be true to the constitutional mandate to let all ideas alone. If our Constitution permitted
'reasonable' regulation of freedom of expression, . . . we would be in a
field where the legislative and the judiciary would have much leeway.
But under our charter all regulation or control of expression is barred.
Government does not sit to reveal where the 'truth' is. People are left
to pick and choose between competing offerings. There is no compulsion
to take and read what is repulsive any more than there is to spend one's
time poring over government bulletins, political tracts, or theological
treatises. The theory is that people are mature enough to pick and
choose, to recognize trash when they see it, to be attracted to the literature that satisfies their deepest need, and, hopefully, to move from
plateau to plateau and finally reach the world of enduring ideas.
I think this is the ideal of the Free Society written into our Constitution. We have no business acting as censors or endowing any group
with censorship powers. It is shocking to me for us to send to prison
anyone for publishing anything, especially tracts so distant from any
incitement to action as the ones before us.
Id. at 491-92. See also Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 196 (1964) (Black,
and Douglas, JJ., concurring). For other cases in which Justices Douglas
and Black have concurred that the First Amendment is absolute, see Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. (1968); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559 (1965);
Wilkinson v. United States, 365 U.S. 399 (1960) ; Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343
U.S. 250 (1952); Rochine v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952); Adamson v.
California, 332 U.S. 46 (1947).
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because it is a "distinct and easily identifiable class of material"
not embodying a "communication of ideas or artistic values.'16
Reasoning similarly, Justice Brennan has stated that the purpose
of the First Amendment is to protect unfettered exchange of political and social ideas, intended to bring about desired social
change.- But obscenity, he maintains, is worthless and, as such,
cannot be an essential part of an exposition of such ideas. 8 However, a majority of the Court in other areas.of speech, has stated
that constitutional protection does not depend upon the social
utility of the ideas expressed. 9 Justice Harlan, in his own opinion in Roth, rejected Justice Brennan's view by stating that every
communication has a "'value of its own."' 20

Justice Black has

also opposed the majority supposition in Roth: "[w]hat is one
man's amusement teaches another doctrine."'" The two recent
appointees, Justices Burger and Blackmun, have not spoken di2
2
rectly to this issue.

Although the Justices have failed to reach agreement on the
breadth of the First Amendment, it is clear that under Roth, obscenity is outside its scope. However, 12 years after Roth, in
Stanley v. Georgia,23 the Court altered its interpretation of the

First Amendment, when it announced that "mere private possession of obscene matter cannot constitutionally be made a
crime. '

24

The Court found that the First Amendment did pro-

16 Ginzburg v. United States 383 U.S. 463 (1966) :
... Such materials include photographs, both still and motion picture,
with no pretense of artistic value, graphically depicting acts of sexual
intercourse, including various acts of sodomy and sadism, and sometimes
involving several participants in scenes of orgy-like character. They also
include strips of drawings in comic-book format grossly depicting similar
activities in an exaggerated fashion. There are, in addition, pamphlets
and booklets, sometimes with photographic illustrations, verbally describing such activities in a bizarre manner with no attempt whatsoever to
afford portrayals of character or situation and with no pretense to
literary value.

All of this material .

.

. cannot conceivably be charac-

terized as embodying communication of ideas or artistic values inviolate
under the First Amendment ....
Id. at 499 n.3.
17 Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957).
L8 Id.
19 N.A.A.C.P. v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 445 (1963).
20 Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 497 (1957)
(Harlan, J., dissenting).
21 Mishkin v. New York, 383 U.S. 502, 510 (1966).
22 Neither Chief Justice Burger nor Justice Blackmun have spoken
directly, however they have spoken concerning obscenity regulation, see
Walker v. Ohio, 398 U.S. 434 (1970) (Burger, Chief Justice, dissenting).
See also Cain v. Kentucky, 397 U.S. 319 (1970) (Burger, Chief Justice dissenting) :
In my view we should not inflexibly deny to each of the States the power
to adopt and enforce its own standards as to obscenity and pornographic
materials; States ought to be free to deal with varying conditions and
problems in this area.
Id. at 319. Hoyt v. Minnesota, 399 U.S. 524 (1970) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
23394 U.S. 557 (1969).

24

1d. at 559.
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tect obscene materials in a limited sense in the privacy of an individual's home:
If the First Amendment means anything, it means that a State has
no business telling a man, sitting alone in his25 own house, what

books he may read or what films he may watch.
However, this pronouncement was not based solely upon the
guarantees of the First Amendment, for it is the Fourth Amendment which extends the right of privacy, not the First.26 Therefore, the Court found it necessary to combine the force of both
Amendments so that Constitutional protection could be extended
to obscenity. Sole reliance by the Court upon the First Amendment would have required overruling Roth, which the Court was
expressly not willing to do.27 But the plurality in Stanley was
willing to reject Justice Brennan's view that the First Amendment only protects an exchange of ideas. They held that although the material in Stanley's possession was devoid of any
ideological content, it was still entitled to Constitutional protec28
tion.
Although the Court in Stanley was concerned with the applicability of the First Amendment to obscenity regulation, the
equally grave problem of determining the meaning and the application of the standard for determining what is obscene was not
considered. The Court assumed, arguendo, that the films found
in Stanley's possession were obscene. 29 However, it should be
noted that in order for an exception to a constitutional mandate
to be upheld (such as obscenity is to the First Amendment), the
standard determining this exception must be defined in a narrow
manner so as to provide predictability2 ° The standard in obscenity regulation should provide the author or publisher with a
means to predict the legality of his work by an objective test.
However, an individual's determination of what is obscene must
necessarily be a subjective judgment. It is the result of a personal, emotional reaction, propounded by the fact that a clear line
at 565.
6'OSee Mancusi v. DeForte, 392 U.S. 364 (1968), aff'g 379 F.2d 897
(2d Cir. 1967); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961); Jones v. United
States, 357 U.S. 493 (1958), where the Court stated that "[tlhe decisions of
this court have ... underscored the essential purpose of the Fourth Amendment to shield the citizen from unwarranted intrusions into his privacy."
Id. at 498. This right of privacy is in contrast to the protection of property
also guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment. The fact that a large quantity
of allegedly obscene material has been seized before an adversary hearing
has been held and has caused the owner great property losses has not influenced many courts. See, e.g., Outdoor Am. Corp. v. Philadelphia, 333
F.2d 963 (3dCir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 903 (1964); Dale Book Co. v.
Leary, 233 F. Supp. 754 (E.D. Pa. 1964), aff'd, 389 F.2d 40 (3d Cir. 1968).
27 394 U.S. at 568.
28d at 565.
25 Id.

29 Id.
30

E.g., Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951).

81 Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 566 (1969) ; Roth v. United States,
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between obscenity and artistic expression does not exist. 31 Thus,
the subjective nature of an obscenity determination has resulted
in an inadequate standard for predicting, with any degree of
certainty, when a matter will be held to be obscene.
In 1896, the Court said, "[t]he words, 'obscene, lewd and
lascivious,' as used [in the federal obscenity statute] signify that
form of immorality which has relation to sexual impurity. '' 32 But
the first modern standard for determining if a matter will be considered obscene was stated by Justice Brennan for the majority of
the Court in Roth v. United States,33 as "[wihether to the average person, applying contemporary community standards, the
dominant theme of the material taken as a whole appeals to
the prurient interest. ' 3 4 Justice Brennan argued that historically
the First Amendment rejects obscenity as utterly devoid of redeeming social importance. Thus, he implied that for a matter
to be considered obscene it must, in addition to violating the
stated standard, be devoid of any idea or social value.32
Four Judges did not join in the majority opinion. Justices
Douglas and Black argued against all censorship except where it
could be shown that "the particular publication has an impact
on action the government can control."3 1 Justice Harlan wanted
to limit federal obscenity regulation to "hardcore pornography"
only3 7 and to grant to the states broader censorship powers,
which he did not spell out.88 He further argued that the Court's
decision in Roth would result in the fact-finder determining
whether the material was obscene, rather than the reviewing
courts. He stated that the Supreme Court should make the determination as a matter of Constitutional law.3 9 Chief Justice
354 U.S. 476, 488 (1957) ; Id. at 497-98 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
32 Swearingen v. United States, 161 U.S. 446, 451 (1896).
33 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
S34
Id. at 489 (footnote omitted).

5 Id. at 484.

36 Id. at 511.

7 Id. at 507. Justice Harlan relied on the government's examples of
hardcore pornography and never defined it himself.

38 Id. at 500-08.

The danger is perhaps not great if the people of one State, through their
legislature, decide that 'Lady Chatterley's Lover' goes so far beyond the
acceptable standards of candor that it will be deemed offensive and nonsellable, for the State next door is still free to make its own choice. At

least we do not have one uniform standard. The fact that the people of
one State cannot read some of the works of D. H. Lawrence seems to
me, if not wise or desirable, at least acceptable.

But that no person in

the United States should be allowed to do so seems to me to be intolerable, and violative of both the letter and spirit of the First Amendment.
Id. at 506.
39 Id. at 497-98. Justice Harlan illustrating that the determination of
censorable obscenity is "not really an issue of fact but a constitutional
judgment of the most sensitive and delicate kind," stated:
Many juries might find that Joyce's 'Ulysses' or Bocaccio's 'DeCameron'
was obscene, and yet the conviction of a defendant for selling either
book would raise, for me, the gravest constitutional problems, for no
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Warren, in his concurring opinions, stated that the central issue
in obscenity cases is not the obscenity of the book or picture, but
the conduct of the defendant.4 0 While he held that the nature of
the materials was relevant as an attribute of the defendant's
conduct, a "different result might be reached in a different setting."',1
This disagreement among the Justices coupled with the failure of the Court to apply the Roth standard, except in four

cases,'4 2 led to considerable confusion in the local and lower federal courts in their attempts to conform to the Supreme Court's
dictates.41 In an attempt to refine the definition of obscenity as
expressed in Roth, Justice Brennan nine years later in Memoirs
v. Massachusetts,4 4 enunciated a tri-part6 test, which provides
that three elements must coalesce before an item can be deter-

mined obscene:
[I]t must be established that (a) the dominant theme of the material taken as a whole appeals to the prurient interest in sex; (b)
the material is patently offensive because it affronts contemporary
community standards relating to the description or representation
of sexual matters;
and (c) the material is utterly without redeem4
ing social value.

5

But, this definition, even though more easily applied than the
Roth standard, is laden with ambiguities.
The first element requires an examination of the work as a
whole rather than a selection of isolated passages or excerpts in
judging the obscenity of an entire work.4 6 Upon examination,

the "dominant theme" of the "whole" work must appeal to the
prurient interest, which was defined in Roth as "having a tendency to excite lustful thoughts, ' ' 47 in the "average person." Alsuch verdict could convince me, without more, that these books are
'utterly without redeeming social importance.'
Id. at 498.
40 Id. at 495. By this statement the Chief Justice hinted at what was to
become a determining factor in obscenity decisions: pandering. See Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463 (1966); see notes 72 through 75 infra
and text accompanying.
41 Id. at 495.
42 Mishkin v. New York, 383 U.S. 502 (1966); Memoirs v. Massachusetts
383 U.S. 413 (1966); Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184 (1964); Manual
Enterprises, Inc. v. Day, 370 U.S. 478 (1962).
4 See e.g., Stein v. Batchelor, 300 F. Supp. 602 (N.D. Tex., 1969);
United States v. A Motion Picture Entitled "I Am Curious - Yellow," 404
F.2d 196 (2d Cir., 1968); Hudson v. United States, 234 A.2d 903 (D.C.,
1967); Cain v. Kentucky, 997 U.S. 319 (1970), rev'd per curiam.
4 4383 U.S.
413 (1966). The book concerned, commonly known as
Fanny Hill, was J. CLELAND, MEMOIRS OF A WOMAN OF PLEASURE (1750).
45 Id. at 418.

46 354 U.S. at 488-89. Justice Brennan explicitly overruled the Hicklin
test which allowed the courts to judge obscenity by isolated passages. Regina
v. Hicklin, L.R. 3 Q.B. 360 (1868). The Court subsequently overruled the
Postmaster General who sought to ban the unexpurgated edition of Lady
Chatterley's Lover in Grove Press, Inc. v. Christenberry, 175 F. Supp. 488,
501 (S.D.N.Y. 1959), aff'd 276 F.2d 433, 437-39 (2d Cir. 1960).
47 354 U.S. 487 n.20.
The Court noted that the definition in the
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though, as originally stated, an "average person" was thought to
be an adult member of the general public,48 in a companion case
to Memoirs, Mishkin v. New York, 49 the Court modified this concept. The majority held that if the material is designed for and
primarily disseminated to a deviant sexual group, such as homosexuals, rather than to the general public, the material will be
considered obscene if it appeals to the prurient interest in sex in
members of that group, even if the material would not stir a
similar emotion reaction in the average person in the general
Roth
public. 50 The Mishkin opinion is the singular instance since
51
in which a majority of the Court agreed in one opinion.
While a majority of the Court agreed as to the group in
whom the prurient interest might be aroused, no such agreement
has been reached as to the "contemporary community" whose
standards should be used in judging the offensiveness of the material. Justices Brennan and Goldberg have stated that the community should be the "national" community when dealing with
both federal and state legislation.5 2 Justice Stewart has held
that the national standard should be applicable to federal obscenity statutes only. 53 Justice Harlan, however, feels that although a national standard should be applied when dealing with
54
a federal statute, the real decision should rest with each state.
He argues that there would be a great danger of federal censorship if one nationwide standard would be applied. But, this danger to the freedom to gratify different tastes in literature would
American Law Institute's Draft Penal Code and the definition prescribed
in the decision were similar. However, the Court has never explained its
assertion of equivalency between material tending to "excite lust" and
material appealing to "shameful" or "morbid" interests in sex. In practice,
the Court seems to look to sexual arousal as the principal element of prurient
interest.
48 354 U.S. at 490.
Justice Brennan quoted the trial court's instruction
to the jury:
The test is not whether it would arouse sexual desires or sexual
impure thoughts in those comprising a particular segment of the community, the young, the immature or the highly prudish or would leave
another segment, the scientific or highly educated or the so-called
worldly-wise and sophisticated indifferent and unmoved ....
The test in each case is the effect of the book, picture or publication
considered as a whole, not upon any particular class, but upon all those
whom it is likely to reach. In other words, you determine its impact upon
the average person in the community.
Id. at 490.
49 383 U.S. 502 (1966).
50 Id. at 508.
51 However, in a similar case, materials similar to those involved in
Mishkin were held not obscene by the Court. Central Magazine Sales, Ltd.
v. United States, 389 U.S. 50 (1967).
52 Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 193-96 (1964).
53 Manual Enterprises, Inc. v. Day, 370 U.S. 478, 488 (1962).
54 370 U.S. 378, 488 where Justice Harlan said that a standard based
on local communities would have "the intolerable consequence" of denying the
material to some parts of the country and permitting other sections access
to it. But see note 55 infra.
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not be present if the States were free to experiment with the
same or bolder books.5 5 In a similar vein, Justices Clark and
Warren have urged the use of local community standards when
dealing with State regulation. 6 But, the use of local or state
standards would result in several inconsistencies. A disseminator of literature which has been adjudicated in one state not to
be obscene, may rely upon that State's decision. However, he
may still be convicted of selling obscene material if another state
of dissemination determines the material to be obscene by its own
"contemporary community standards." Use of local or state
standards could also result in prior restraint of literature. A
purveyor of material, found to be obscene in one state, might not
distribute the material in another state for fear of conviction,
when, in fact, the material would not have been held obscene by
that state's "contemporary community standards." Therefore,
while the use of a "national" standard does inherently contain a
danger of suppressing the freedom to gratify a particular taste
in literature, as suggested by Justice Harlan, 7 it does insure a
consistency, which the use of state or local standards cannot.
The application of the third element of the Memoirs coalesence, that the material be "utterly without redeeming social
value," has resulted in a serious disagreement between the Justices. In the plurality opinion of Memoirs, Justices Brennan,
Fortas and Warren stated their view that this third element was
to be applied independently of the other two. 58 Therefore, they
hold that even if the material is found to be patently offensive
and to appeal to the prurient interest in sex, it should be afforded
First Amendment protection if any social value can be found.59
This application seems inconsistent with the plurality's choice of
When read literally, the use of the
the modifier, "redeeming.'6
phrase, "redeeming social value," would seem to indicate a balancing of social value against the other two factors in the test.
But, only Justice Clark has read this to be the proper interpretation." Justice White, however, holds that social value is relevant
55 Memoirs v. Massachusettes, 383 U.S. 413, 457-58 (1966) (Harlan, J.,
dissenting). The Justice seems to have partially changed his position, see
Manual Enterprises, Inc. v. Day, 370 U.S. 478, 488 (1962). See note 54 supra.
56 Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 200 (1964).
57 See note 55 supra.
58 Memoirs v. Massachusettes, 383 U.S. 413 (1966).
59
60 Id. at 419.
Id.at 418.
61 Id.at 441-43 (Clark, J., dissenting). Justice Clark pointed out that
the Majority in Roth never held "social value" to be a test. He noted that
it was in Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 191 (1964), seven years after Roth,

where Justice Brennan mentioned the "social value" test and that Justice
Brennan's opinion in Jacobellis was the only one to mention such a test.
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"only to determine the predominant prurient interest of the ma62
terial."
In addition to the diversity of opinion in the application of
the social value test, the Court has not been explicit as to what is
meant by the use of the term. Presumably, artistic, literary,
philosophical and scientific ideas are included in this definition,
while mere entertainment is not.63 However, the exact quality or
quantity of social value needed to "redeem" the material has not
been even remotely discussed by the Court.
This lack of clarity in the standards to be applied when using the Memoirs test has been increased by the failure of the Justices themselves to agree. While Justice Brennan was joined in
his opinion in Roth by four other Justices,64 only two agreed with
him in his Memoirs restatement.
The state of disagreement
was such that Memoirs inspired a total of seven opinions.
Justices Black 6 and Douglas 67 in concurring opinions in
Memoirs restated that there is no federal power of censorship.
Justice Stewart, also concurring in Memoirs on the basis of his
dissent in a companion case, Ginzburg v. United States, 68 stated
that there was power to censor "hardcore pornography," but that
the novel in Memoirs, in his opinion, was not within this classification.6 9 He did not, however, add any clarity to this problem of
definition:
I shall not today attempt further to define the kinds of materials I
understand to be [hard-core pornography]; and perhaps I could
never succeed in intelligibly doing so. But I know it when I see
it.70

Justice Black, dissenting in Ginzburg, summed up the effect of
Memoirs, Ginzburg, and Mishkin, all handed down the same day:
My conclusion is that certainly after the fourteen separate opinions
handed down in these three cases today no person, not even the
most learned judge, much less a layman, is capable of knowing in
advance of an ultimate decision in his particular case by this Court
whether certain material comes within the area of 'obscenity' as
that term is confused by the Court today.62 383 U.S. at 462.

63 E.g., Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 566 (1969).
6 Justices Frankfurter, Burton, Clark and Whittaker.
15 Chief Justice Warren and Justice Fortas.
66 Memoirs v. Massachusettes, 383 U.S. 413, 424 (1966) (concurring, on
basis of his dissenting opinion in Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463,
476 (1966)).
67 383 U.S. at 424.
68 383 U.S. 463 (1966).
69 Id. at 499.

7oJacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964).

71383 U.S. 463, 480-81
(1966). Such uncertainty may be a danger.
Justice Douglas, believes any test may impinge upon the freedom of ex-

pression:
As a people, we cannot afford to relax that standard of freedom of expression. For the test that suppresses a cheap tract today can suppress
a literary gem tomorrow. All it need do is incite a lascivious thought or
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In addition to an application of the Memoirs tri-part6 test,
Ginzburg v. United States,72 allows the courts to consider how the
material was advertised and distributed. 73 If the Court finds
that the material was pandered, i.e., openly advertised so as to
appeal to the customer's erotic interests,14 this factor may be
considered in determining the obscenity of the publication.15
However, close examination of this approach reveals that pandering has no actual affect on the intrinsic quality of the publication itself. That is, pandering reflects only upon the manner of
dissemination but does not change the actual social value, literary
attributes or patent offensiveness of the material itself. This
approach signifies that the Court is looking to the conduct of the
defendant rather than making a determination as to the character of the material."6 However, if the central issue in an obscenity case is the nature of the material itself, which is the
underlying consideration of Roth and Memoirs, the manner in
which the defendant purveys the material in question should
make no difference in the outcome. However, the Court has
failed to see this distinction and has found that when pandering
is present in the case, the material will be found obscene, even
though had the Court used the Memoirs test alone, such a finding
. 7
would not have resulted
The Memoirs standard, as applied to minors, was modified
in Ginzburg v. New York.-8

The Court realized the necessity of

statutes dealing expressly with minors and found a definite state
interest in protecting youth."9 The Court indicated that minors
arouse a lustful desire. The list of books that judges or juries can place
in that category is endless.
Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 495 (1957).
72 383 U.S. 463 (1966).
Petitioner Ginzburg and three corporations
were convicted of violating the federal obscenity statute, 18 U.S.C. §1461, for
mailing three publications, including a popular magazine, Eros.
73 Id. at 475-76.
The evidence was sufficient to show that each of the
three publications involved were openly advertised in a manner intended as
a ". . . deliberate representation . . ." of what is "erotically arousing." Id.
at 470. Eros sought mailing privileges from two Pennsylvania hamlets
(Blue Ball and Intercourse), and it was obvious to the Court that this
choice was made for the purpose of selling "their publications on the basis
of salacious appeal." Id. at 467.
74 Id. at 467.
Justice Brennan relied on the concurring opinion of
Chief Justice Warren in Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 495-96 (1957).
7 383 U.S. at 463, where the Court claimed that the defendant "deliberately emphasized the sexually provocative aspects of the work in order to
catch the salaciously disposed." Id. at 472.
76 This determination was forecast by Chief Justice Warren in his concurring opinion in Roth. See note 40 supra.
77See Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
78 390 U.S. 629 (1968).
79 The Court relied on and quoted Chief Judge Fuld in his opinion in
People v. Kahan, 15 N.Y.2d 311, 206 N.E.2d 333, 258 N.Y.S.2d 391, where
he stated:
While the supervision of children's reading may best be left to their
parents, the knowledge that parental control or guidance cannot always
be provided and society's transcendent interest in protecting the welfare

1971]

Obscenity Regulation

are not entitled to the same constitutional protection to read or
view material of their own choice as are adults8o The Ginzburg
standard is complex, for material must fall within one or more
objectively defined categories of explicit sexual material and must
also be "harmful to minors."s1 This standard incorporates a
modification of the Memoirs elements: a) an appeal to the prurient interest in minors; b) patent offensiveness as determined by
prevailing standards in the adult community with respect to what
is suitable for minors; and c) utter lack of redeeming social value
of children justify reasonable regulation of the sale of material to them.

It is, therefore, altogether fitting and proper for a state to include in a
statute designed to regulate the sale of pornography to children special

standards, broader than those embodied in legislation aimed at controlling
dissemination of such material to adults.
Id. at 312, 206 N.E.2d at 334-35, 258 N.Y.S.2d at 392.

80 390 U.S. at 639-40.
81 Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1966).
The definitional and prohibitory section of the Ginsberg statute are
as follows:
1. Definitions. As used in this section:
(a) 'Minor' means any person under the age of seventeen years.
(b) 'Nudity' means the showing of the human male or female genitals,
pubic area or buttocks with less than a full opaque covering, or the
showing of the female breast with less than a fully opaque covering of
any portion thereof below the top of the nipple, or the depiction of
covered male genitals in a discernibly turgid state.
(c) 'Sexual conduct means acts of masturbation, homosexuality, sexual
intercourse, or physical contact with a person's clothed or unclothed
genitals, pubic area, buttocks or, if such person be a female, breast.
(d) 'Sexual excitement' means the condition of human male or female
genitals when in a state of sexual stimulation or arousal.
(e) 'Sado-masochistic abuse' means flagellation or torture by or upon a
person clad in undergarments, a mask or bizarre costume, or the condition of being fettered, bound or otherwise physically restrained on the
part of one so clothed.
(f) 'Harmful to minors' means that quality of any description or
representation, in whatever form, of nudity, sexual conduct, sexual excitement, or sado-masochistic abuse, when it:
(i) predominantly appeals to the prurient, shameful or morbid interest of minors and
(ii) is patently offensive to pervailing standards in the adult community as a whole with respect to what is suitable material for
minors, and
(iii) is utterly without redeeming social importance for minors.
(g) 'Knowingly means having general knowledge of, or reason to know,
or a belief or ground for belief which warrants further inspection or
inquiry of both:
(i) the character and content of any material described herein
which is reasonably susceptible of examination by the defendant, and
(ii) the age of the minor, provided however, that an honest mistake
shall constitute an excuse from liability hereunder if the defendant
made a reasonable bona fide attempt to ascertain the true age of
such minor.
2. It shall be unlawful for any person knowingly to sell or loan for
monetary consideration to a minor:
,(a) any picture, photograph, drawing, sculpture, motion picture film,
or similar visual representation or image of a person or portion of the
human body which depicts nudity, sexual conduct or sado-masochistic
abuse and which is harmful to minors, or
(b) any book, pamphlet, magazine, printed matter however reproduced, or sound recording which contains any matter enumerated
in paragraph (a) of subdivision two hereof, or explicit and detailed
verbal descriptions or narrative accounts of sexual excitement, sexual
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However, the Ginzburg decision does not require

that statutes conform to this standard. Rather, the Court states
that categories defined in a state statute may be constitutionally
applied so long as it is "not irrational for the legislature to find
that exposure to material condemned by the statute is harmful to
minors." 3
Obscenity statutes, other than those directed only to minors,
must incorporate the Memoirs tri-part6 test, even though this
test was set out in a plurality rather than a majority opinion.
As long as Justices Douglas and Black continue to take the view
that no general obscenity prohibition is constitutionally permissible, and three other Justices employ the Memoirs test as the
constitutional standard for determining what is obscene, any
statute failing to incorporate this test will be held unconstitutional upon appeal.
Although the Supreme Court requires the states and federal
government to incorporate the Memoirs test in their statutes, the
Court has not aided the lower courts in its application. It now
seems apparent that the Court itself has not completely adopted
Memoirs. In Redrup v. New York,8 4 the Court reversed three
obscenity convictions that had been affirmed in the state courts
of New York, Kentucky and Arkansas.85

Rather than applying

the Memoirs standards to reach its determination, the Court
summarized the views of the different Justices, as expressed in
previous opinions, and stated that whichever of these constitutional views is applied to the materials in question, the judgments
cannot stand.86 Therefore, the Court avoided an application of
Memoirs to the facts of the case, and it was apparent from the
per curiam opinion that such a decision could either not have
been reached by an application of the Memoirs test alone, or
would not have been reached by Memoirs alone because of the
divergent views of the Justices.8
conduct or sado-masochistic abuse and which, taken as a whole, is harmful to minors.
3. It shall be unlawful for any person knowingly to exhibit for a monetary consideration to a minor or knowingly to sell to a minor an
admission ticket or pass or knowingly to admit a minor for a monetary
consideration to premises wherein there is exhibited, a motion picture,
show or other presentation which, in whole or in part, depicts nudity,
sexual conduct or sado-maschistic abuse and which is harmful to minors.
Id. at 645-47.
82

Id. at 645.

83 Id. at 639.
94 386 U.S. 767 (1967), per curiam, rehearing denied sub nom. Austin
v. Kentucky, 388 U.S. 924 (1967).
85 Austin v. Kentucky, 386 S.W.2d 270 (Ky. 1965); Gent v. Arkansas,
239 Ark. 747, 343 S.W.2d 219 (1965).
86 Redrup v. New York, 386 U.S. 767, 770-71 (1966).
See notes 44
through 71 supra and text accompanying.
87

Id. at 771.
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The refusal by the Court to apply Memoirs is evidenced by
their decisions since Redrup, which have been rendered per
curiam. They reverse the convictions and cite almost invariably
to Redrup.8 Thus, the Court appears to be relying on no standard at all, and instead is rendering ad hoc decisions."9
PROCEDURAL REQUIREMENTS
Although obscenity in most circumstances falls outside the

safeguards of the First Amendment, publications determined not
to be obscene must be afforded full constitutional protection.so
In order to insure complete freedom of dissemination of protected material, the Court has developed a system of "procedural
safeguards designed to obviate the dangers of a censorship system."9 1 Rather than attempting to apply the traditional due
process requirements of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments
to obscenity determinations, the Court has developed a different

standard which inquires as to whether the procedure shows "the
necessary sensitivity to freedom of expression. '9 2 By application
of this test, states must regard the possible consequences to constitutionally protected free speech when adopting procedures for
dealing with obscenity.9 3

Essential to due process in adjudicating First Amendment
rights is the requirement that a judicial, rather than an adminis88 See Henry v. Louisiana, 392 U.S. 655 (1968); Felton v. City of
Pensacola, 390 U.S. 340 (1968); Robert-Arthur Management Corp. v. Tennessee ex rel. Canale, 389 U.S. 578 (1968); I.M. Amusement Corp. v. Ohio,
389 U.S. 573 (1968); Chance v. California, 389 U.S. 89 (1967) ; Central
Magazine Sales, Ltd. v. United States, 389 U.S. 50 (1967); Conner v.
Hammond, 389 U.S. 48 (1967); Potomac News Co. v. United States, 389
U.S. 47 (1967); Schackman v. California, 388 U.S. 454 (1967); Mazes v.
Ohio, 388 U.S. 453 (1967); A Quantity of Copies of Books v. Kansas, 388
U.S. 452 (1967) ; Books Inc. v. United States, 388 U.S. 449 (1967) ; Aday
v. United States, 388 U.§. 447 (1967); Avansino v. New York, 388 U.S. 446
(1967); Sheperd v. New York, 388 U.S. 444 (1967); Covert v. New York,
388 U.S. 443 (1967) ; Ratner v. California, 388 U.S. 442 (1967) ; Friedman
v. New York, 388 U.S. 441 (1967); Kenney v. New York, 388 U.S.
440 (1967).
89See, e.g., Hunt v. Keriakos, 428 F.2d 606 (1970), cert. denied, 38
U.S.L.W. 3477 (April 13, 1971). Justice Douglas in reference to the material
in question merely stated that no picture of the female anatomy if not
engaged in sexual activity could be considered obscene.
90 Like the substantive rules themselves, insensitive procedures can
"chill" the right of free expression. See Monighan, First Amendment "Due
Process", 83 HARV. L. REv. 518 (1970) for a complete discussion of procedural problems.
91 Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 58 (1965).
92 Id. See also Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958) where it was
recognized that "the line between speech unconditionally guaranteed and

speech which may legitimately be regulated .

.

. is finely drawn ....

The

separation of legitimate from illegitimate speech calls for . . . sensitive
tools...." Id. at 525.

93Marcus v. Search Warrant, 367 U.S. 717 (1961) where the Court
stated that "a state is not free to adopt whatever procedures it pleases for
dealing with obscenity . . . without regard to the possible consequences for
constitutionally protected speech." Id. at 731. In Bantam Books, Inc. v.
Sullivan, 372 U.S. .58 (1963),

the Court held, ".

.

. that the freedoms of

expression must be ringed about with adequate bulwarks."

Id. at 66.
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trative, determination of obscenity is necessary.9 4 In Manual
Enterprises v. Day,9 5 the petitioner was charged with violating

18 U.S.C. §1461 (1964), which excluded from the mails allegedly
obscene material9

6

He first appeared before a "judicial officer"

of the Post Office and then appealed the finding of obscenity to
an administrative board of the Post Office before the case was
litigated in the federal district court. While no majority opinion
was reached by the Court, Justice Harlan, joined by Justice Stewart, found the material lacking the essential Roth element of

patent offensiveness and reversed in favor of the petitioner."
In an elaborate concurring opinion, Justice Brennan, joined by

Chief Justice Warren and Justice Douglas, raised the question
of whether Congress could provide that the issue of obscenity be
determined by any forum other than a court, without violating
the "procedural safeguards" necessary to prevent "erosion of
First Amendment liberties." 9 In his opinion, Justice Brennan
94 The hearing need not be a "fully matured action at law."
Fontaine
v. Dial, 303 F. Supp. 436, 440 n.7 (W.D. Tex. 1969), appeal dismissed, 399
U.S. 521 (1970). A good description of a hearing is found in the Brief for
Appellee at 15, Bethview Amusement Corp. v. Cahn, 416 F.2d 410 (2d Cir.
1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 920 (1970) :
No precedent contemplates that such a hearing be a plenary trial. At
best it would be similar to the preliminary hearings afforded defendants
in felony . . . cases. Its purpose could be to determine whether prima
facia a crime had been committed. Such a hearing would in effect be
the sole protection that an exhibitor would have against harassment and
disruption of business activities. It would be conducted in a courtroom
with due process procedures including the ... right of cross-examination.
It would have a salutary effect in that some exhibitors upon being
apprised of such a hearing may voluntarily discontinue exhibition without having to run the gamut of sudden seizure and arrest. It removes
the onus on judges of having to ride circuit to various theatres....
Id. at 15.
95 370 U.S. 478 (1962) (Brennan, J., concurring):
I imply no doubt that Congress could constitutionally authorize a noncriminal process in the nature of a judicial proceeding under closely
defined procedural safeguards. But the suggestion that Congress may
constitutionally authorize any process other than a fully judicial one
immediately raises the gravest doubts.
Id. at 518-19.
In Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51 (1965), Mr. Justice Brennan
made the Court's position quite clear:
[B]ecause only a judicial determination in an adversary proceeding
insures the necessary sensitivity to freedom of expression, only a procedure requiring a judicial determination suffices to impose a valid
final restraint.
Id. at 58. See discussion infra of Blount v. Rizzi. For a history of the
administrative proceeding and court determination conflicts, see L. JAFFE,
JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION (1965).
9618 U.S.C. §1461 (1964) declared that obscene materials were "nonmailable matter [which] shall not be conveyed in the mails or delivered
from any post office or by any letter carrier."
For a collection of cases
dealing with the power of the Post Office to bar obscene materials from the
mails, see Annot., 76 L. Ed. 845 (1932); Annot., 8 L. Ed. 2d 1045 (1963).
See Paul & Schwartz, Obscenity in the Mails; A Comment on Some Problems
of Federal Censorship,106 U. PA. L. REv. 214 (1957).
97 370 U.S. at 495.
98 Id. at 497-98. In dissent, Justice Clark apparently disagreed, id. at
523-24, yet he purported to reserve judgment on the point. Id. at 521 n.2.
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seemed to suggest that the First Amendment, itself, rather than
the due process clause demanded a judicial determination of obscenity.9 The use of the First Amendment as the basis for due
process in obscenity determinations would mean that the procedural rules flowing therefrom would be directly responsive to
the First Amendment interests which the rules are designed to

protect.
The following year in Bantam Books v. Sullivan,10 the Court
condemned a procedure where a state obscene literature committee pressured local retailers into removing objectionable materials from their shelves by rendering "advice" in the form of
threatened criminal prosecution. The Court held that the actions of the commission resulted in an unconstitutional prior re-

straint on expression."'

In condemning the procedure the Court

relied on two deficiencies; that there was no "judicial superintendence" of the commission and no guarantee of an immediate
judicial determination of the validity of the commission's de0 2
cision.'
In Freedman v. Maryland,1° 3 which followed Bantam Books,
the Court invalidated the Maryland motion picture censorship
statute. Crucial to the decision was the Court's statement:
The teaching of our cases is that, because only a judicial determination in an adversary proceeding insures the necessary sensitivity
to freedom of expression, only a procedure requiring a judicial determination suffices to impose a valid final restraint.' 0
The Court's preference for a judicial determination, rather than
a decision by an administrative agency is a result of the belief
that judges will be more likely to be sensitive to the guarantees
of the First Amendment. 0°
In addition, judges usually serve
Justice Harlan intimated that previous decisions of the Court would permit
such a procedure, but reversed an express statement until a "full-dress argument and briefing" was presented. Id. at 480 n.2.
99 Similarly it was suggested that judicial review of administrative
agency decision would be required by use of Article III of the Constitution
in addition to the due process clause. See Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22
(1932).
100 372 U.S. 58 (1963).
101 Id. at 72. The operation of the committee "was in fact a scheme of

state censorship effectuated by extralegal sanctions; they acted as an agency
not to advise but to suppress." In State Cinema, Inc. v. Ryan, 303 F. Supp.
579 (D. Mass. 1969), the court found Bantam Books applicable only to public
threats by local officials not private citizen groups.
102 Id. at 70-72.
103 380 U.S. 51 (1965). See also Teitel Film Corp. v. Cusack, 390 U.S.
139 (1968).
104 380 U.S. at 58.

Judges have, or should have, the leisure, the training, and the insulation to follow the ways of the scholar in pursuing the ends of government. This is crucial in sorting out the enduring values of a society, and it
is not something that institutions can do well occasionally, while operating
for the most part with a different set of gears. A. BICKEL, THE LEAST
105

DANGEROUS BRANCH 25-62 (1962).
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for long periods and are less likely to be influenced by political
considerations, so frequent in administrative decisions. 10 6
While it is clear that it is necessary to have a judicial adjudication rather than an administrative proceeding, the exact role
of the jury in such a determination is not so clear. Since Duncan v. Louisiana1 ' established that a defendant in a proceeding
for a serious crime is entitled to a trial by jury,'10 8 the question of
whether the First Amendment requires the existence of a jury

for an obscenity determination has been raised.

Although Jus-

tice Brennan in Kingsley Books v. Brown'01 urged that the absence of a jury in obscenity proceedings was a "fatal defect,' 1 0
he seems to have abandoned this position. In Jacobellis v.
Ohio,"' Justice Brennan again considered the role of the jury and
he concluded that the question of obscenity is an issue of constitutional law, which must be ultimately decided by the Supreme
Court. 11 2 Therefore, the jury's participation in a criminal obscenity trial would seem to be limited to a factual determination
of the defendant's conduct, such as determining the issue of pan106 The relative insulation of the judges, means, as Professor Hart
observed, that the "structure of American institutions" predestined courts
"to be a voice of reason, charged with the creative function of discerning
afresh and of articulating and developing impersonal and durable principles ...." Hart, The Supreme Court, 1958 Term - Foreword: The Time
Chartof the Justices, 73 HARV. L. REV.84, 99 (1959).
107 391 U.S. 145
(1968). The critical question, however, is whether
the judge, if he finds that the speech is unprotected, must submit the issue
to the jury. Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951), indicates that
the defendant has no constitutional right to insist that the jury pass on
the protected character of the speech. There a divided Court held that the
trial judge had not erred in refusing to submit to the jury the issue of
whether the speech constituted a "clear and present danger." But whatever
the extent of constitutional compulsion, surely no error is committed if the
trial judge does permit the jury to consider whether the speech is protected
- so long as the judge himself has made a determination that it is not.
108 Id; at 147-58.

109 354 U.S. 436 (1957).
119 Id.

The jury represents a cross-section of the community and has a
special aptitude for reflecting the view of the average person. Jury
trial of obscenity therefore provides a peculiarly competent application
of the standard for judging obscenity which, by its definition, calls for
an appraisal of material according to the average person's application of
contemporary community standards. A statute which does not afford
the defendant, of right, a jury determination of obscenity falls short,
in my view, of giving proper effect to the standard fashioned as the
necessary safeguard demanded by the freedoms of speech and press for
material which is not obscene. Of course, as with jury questions generally, the trial judge must initially determine that there is a jury
question, i.e., that reasonable men may differ whether the material is
obscene.
Id. at 448.
111 378 U.S. 184 (1964).

12 Id. at 188.
Shortly after Jacobellis the Supreme Court reversed,
per curiam two Florida appellate decisions where the opinion had stated,
"It is for the trier of fact to determine ...whether or not a given publication
is in fact obscene." See Grove Press v. Gerstein, 156 So. 2d 537 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1963) and Tralins v. Gerstein, 151 So. 2d 19 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1963).
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dering. The actual decision as to the nature of the materials,
therefore, should be decided by the trial judge as a question of
law. Justice Black, however, has disagreed and has stated
that judges "possess no special expertise" qualifying them "to
supervise the morals of the Nation" or to decide what is "good
or bad for local communities. ' 11 3 Despite Justice Black's position, authorities have urged that this is the correct role of the
judge, for he has a far keener understanding of the freedom of
expression than most jurors. "'
The constitution requires the use of "sensitive tools""' for
the determination of First Amendment claims which cannot be
satisfied simply by a judicial proceeding. The determination of
obscenity must either precede governmental action or immediately follow it. The Court has recognized that there are limited
situations where prior restraint may be permissible. In Kingsley Books, Inc. v. Brown,"6 the Court upheld a statute permitting
an ex parte injunction to prevent sale and distribution of printed
obscene material, prior to an adversary hearing. However, the
Court was quick to point out that the duration of the order was
brief, for an adversary proceeding was to follow within twentyfour hours and a decision was guaranteed within two days after
the conclusion of the hearing. Only after a final determination
of the obscenity was a seizure of the material permitted. 117 The
Court has recognized that motion picture exhibitors may be sub18
ject to the same type of restraint prior to a public showing.'
In Times Film Corp. v. Chicago,"" the majority, per Justice
Clark, stated that a requirement to submit a motion picture to
an examination for obscenity prior to a public exhibition is not,
in itself, unconstitutional on its face. 2 0 However, the opinion
made it clear that the decision did not rule on the "statutory
standards employed by the censor or the procedural requirements as to submission of the films," but only on the challenge to
113 Kingsley Int'l Pictures Corp. v. Regents of Univ. of N.Y., 360 U.S.
684, 690 (Black, J., concurring 1959).
114 Lockhart & McClure, Censorship of Obscenity: The Developing ConFor a complete
stitutional Standards, 45 MINN. L. REv. 5, 119 (1960).
discussion of the requirement of adversary hearings in obscenity regulation
and other areas of speech, see Note, PriorAdversary Hearings, 46 N.Y.U.L.
REv. 80 (1971).
115 Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 525 (1958).
116 354 U.S. 436 (1957).
117

Id. at 439.

118 Some courts believe live theatre productions must be treated differ-

ently from either films or books. "The immediacy of the live theatre, its
easy access to the audience. . . distinguish it from a film production where
the possibilities of sexual exhortation and of giving offense are fixed in
celluloid." P.B.I.C., Inc. v. Byrne, 313 F. Supp. 757, 762 (D. Mass.), appeal
filed, 39 U.S.L.W. 3067 (U.S. Aug. 1, 1970). Accord, People v. Bercowitz,
61 Misc. 2d 974, 981-82, 308 N.Y.S.2d. 1, 9 (Crim. Ct. 1970).
119 365 U.S. 43 (1969).
120

Id. at 49.
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the authority of a censor to require such a submission.-2 ' There
followed a vigorous dissent by Chief Justice Warren, in which
he argued that the Chicago licensing statute in question was
"censorship in its purest" form. 1 22 The Chief Justice recognized
that this decision relied on Kingsley, but distinguished that case
because there the Court upheld a statute which insured prompt
judicial review. The Chicago statute, he contended, did not in2
corporate such an assurance.1
The failure of the Court in Times Film to discuss the standards necessary to permit a limited restraint prior to a judicial
determination necessitated the decision of the Court in Freedman v. Maryland. 24 There the Court invalidated the Maryland
picture censorship statute which required an exhibitor to submit
the film to an administrative censorship board prior to public
exhibition. If the film was disapproved by the Board, the exhibitor had the burden of instituting judicial review of the censor's decision. The Court, in a decision by Justice Brennan, held
that in this situation "judicial review may be too little and too
late."' 12' While the Court was unwilling to hold that a motion
picture exhibitor had an absolute right to show a film without a
prior submission to a censor, they stated that such a procedure
would only be constitutional if the exhibitor was assured that
the censor would either issue a license or "go to court to restrain
showing the film [within] ...a specified brief period."' 126 Further,
they held that "the procedure must also assure a prompt final
judicial decision, to minimize the deterrent effect of an interim
and possibly erroneous denial of a license.' 127 Then the Court in
a very unusual move delineated exactly what a statute must contain so that it will be constitutional in light of the First Amendment:
First, the burden of proving that the film is unprotected expression
must rest on the censor .... Second, while the State may require
advance submission of all films, in order to proceed effectively to
bar all showings of unprotected films, the requirement cannot be
administered in a manner which would lend an effect of finality to
the censor's determination whether a film constitutes protected
expression. Any restraint imposed in advance of a final judicial
determination on the merits must similarly be limited to preservation of the status quo for the shortest fixed period compatible with
sound judicial resolution ....

Third, the procedure must also as-

sure a prompt final judicial decision, to minimize the deterrent
121 Id. at 50.
122
123
124
125

Id. at 54.
Id. at 65-66.

126

Id. at 58-59.

127

Id. at 59.

380 U.S. 51 (1965).

Id. at 57.
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effect of an interim and possibly erroneous denial of a license. 12
In light of Freedman, the Chicago motion picture ordinance, upheld in Times Film, was subsequently struck down in Teitel Film
Corp. v. Cusak.1 2
The ordinance had allowed 50 to 57 days to
complete the administrative process and also, failed to provide
for a prompt decision by a court of the nature of the film, if
found obscene by the censor."10
Although Kingsley and Freedman do permit prior restraint
in a limited sense, the Court has consistently refused to permit
wholesale seizures of materials prior to an adversary proceeding
before a court. Two decisions dealing with wholesale seizures
of printed materials were primarily responsible for this development. In Marcus v. A Search Warrant of Property,131 police
officers, acting under a vague, ex parte search warrant, seized
over 1,000 copies of 280 publications before a judicial determination of the unprotected nature of the materials was made. 1 3 2 The
hearing after the seizure resulted in a finding that 180 of the
publications were not obscene. The majority, per Justice Brennan, stated that the states were not free to adopt any procedure
they saw fit regarding obscenity. The Court held that before
speech can be regulated or suppressed, the Constitution requires
a procedure "designed to focus searchingly on the question of obscenity."' 133 Here the Court felt the warrants left far too much
34
discretion in the arresting officer.
In A Quantity of Books v. Kansas,13 5 the Court condemned
a more restrictive procedure than the one found in Marcus. Here,
a judge examined seven books which appeared under the label
Id. at 58-59.
390 U.S. 139 (1967).
130 Id. at 141.
An expedited appeal process is also required if restraint
is sought during the appeal. See Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. Dallas, 390 U.S.
676, 690 n.22 (1968). However, it has been suggested that a publisher who
wins in a lower court should not be subjected to restraint pending appeal.
Tyrone, Inc. v. Wilkinson, 410 F.2d 639 (4th Cir. 1969).
131 367 U.S. 717 (1961).
1832
15 Mo. SuP. CT. R.CRIM. P. 33.01 (1970) and Mo. REV. STAT. §542.380
(1967), provided that a warrant could issue if the judge was satisfied there
was probable cause to believe that obscene materials were in the place to
be searched.
The warrants gave the broadest discretion to the executing officers;
they merely repeated the language of the statute and the complaints,
specified no publications and left to the individual judgment of each
• . . [officer) involved the selection of such magazines as in his view
constituted 'obscene... publication'.
367 U.S. 717, 732 (1961).
188 Id. at 731.
' 34Marcus has been interpreted by some lower courts to invalidate
seizures when the choice of items seized was with the officers' discretion.
See United States v. Marti, 421 F.2d 1263 (2d Cir. 1970); Entertainment
Ventures, Inc. v. Brewer, 306 F. Supp. 802 (M.D. Ala. 1969); Gregory v.
DiFlorio, 298 F. Supp. 1360 (W.D.N.Y. 1969); Evergreen Review, Inc. v.
Cahn, 230 F. Supp. 498 (E.D.N.Y. 1964).
185 378 U.S. 205 (1964).
128

129
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Night Stand. He concluded that they were obscene and were
representative of all books appearing under that label. Upon
this conclusion, he issued a warrant for the seizure of all the
copies of the seven books and all other books which appeared
under the same label. In holding that the procedure was constitutionally deficient with respect to all the books, Justice Brennan in a plurality opinion, stated that any seizure of books prior
to an adversary hearing on their unprotected character was an
impermissable intrusion upon First Amendment rights. 13 6 He
stated that if any "seizure of books preceded an adversary determination of their obscenity, there is danger of abridgment of
the right of the public in a free society to unobstructed circula'' 1 7
tion of non-obscene books.
The reasons underlying the Court's decision in Books, and
the reliance by the Court upon that decision in Freedman,"3
strongly suggest that the propriety of any interim restraint of a
film, as well as a book, must be conditioned upon the availability
of a prior adversary proceeding. The justification for this requirement is apparent in the exhibition of films, where an ex
parte injunction can have a devastating effect.1 39 If the theater
is showing a film, and an ex parte injunction is issued, the theater's business will be interrupted, which could result in a serious
financial loss. An adversary hearing prior to the issuance of an
injunction will clearly reduce the chances of an erroneous decision, for the presence of both parties will insure a more accurate description of the relevant factual considerations, as well
14
as direct the judge's attention to the relevant legal principles. 0
A prior adversary hearing will also satisfy the constitutional re136 Id. at 211. See also Bethview Amusement Corp. v. Cahn, 416 F.2d
410 (2d Cir. 1969) ; Metzger v. Pearcy, 393 F.2d 202, 204 (7th Cir. 1968) ;
Cambist Films, Inc. v. Illinois, 292 F. Supp. 185 (N.D. Ill. 1968); United
States v. Brown, 274 F. Supp. 561 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
137 378 U.S. at 213.
138 See text accompanying notes 124 through 128 supra.
139 The cost of producing "adults only" paperback books is relatively
expensive because press runs are normally small, yet they still usually cost
only between $0.10 and $0.20 per copy to produce. THE REPORT OF THE
COMMISSION ON OBSCENITY AND PORNOGRAPHY 114-15 (Bantam Books ed.

1970). Major film productions can cost as much as $2 million. "Exploitation" film budgets range from $3,000 to $100,000, with the average cost
being $40,000 to produce the negative and $60,000 to release it. Id. at 95.
The argument may not be valid when "skinflicks" are involved since it will
only cost a producer between $900 and $1500 to produce 100 copies each of
four stag films. Id. at 140.
140 See P.B.I.C., Inc. v. Byrne
313 F. Supp. 757, 761 (D. Mass. 1970),
appeal filed, 39 U.S.L.W. 3067 (U.S. Apr. 1, 1970) where the Boston production of "Hair" had $600,000 in advance ticket sales at the time of filing
suit. An "exploitation" film, such as "He and She," has a gross earning
potential of $100,000 per week from showing in eight theatres. VARIETY,
Sept. 2, 1970, at 9.
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quirement that a person may not be deprived of property, here,
box office receipts, without due process of law.' 1
While Freedman seemed to make clear by its reference to
Kingsley, and its reliance upon Books, that "any restraint . . .
until a judicial determination of obscenity following notice and
an adversary hearing,"1'4 would not be permitted, a subsequent
decision by the Court has caused considerable confusion in the
state and lower federal courts. In Lee Art Theatre, Inc. v. Vir4
ginia,1
3 the Court voided the seizure of a film, stating that the
warrant which authorized the seizure was based upon conclusory
evidence, not upon facts. The warrant was issued upon a police
officer's affidavit giving the film's title and stating that he had
determined from personal observation of the film and observation of the theater's billboard that the film was obscene. The
Court held in a brief, per curiam opinion that based upon the officer's assertions, "without any scrutiny by the judge of any materials considered" that the seizure of the film was unconstitutional in light of Marcus.'4 But, the Court expressly reserved
the issue of "whether the justice of the peace should have viewed
the motion picture before issuing the warrant,"' 4 5 and recognized
the difficulty of a judge doing so. By this language the Court
intimated that it was not necessary to have an adversary proceeding prior to the issuance of a warrant, provided that the
judge "scrutinize" the materials. And, indeed, this is exactly
what some state and lower federal courts took these words to
4
mean.1
One district court has interpreted the dictum in Lee Art to
mean that if the judge views the film himself, and in his own
judgment finds it obscene, or if he inquires into the factual basis
for the officer's conclusion that it is obscene, he may issue a warrant to have it seized, and there need be no prior adversary hearU.S. CONSr. amend. V.
142 Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 60 (1965).

142

143392 U.S. 636 (1968).
'"Id. at 636-37.
Id. at 637.
148 See, e.g., United States v. Wild, 422 F.2d 34 (2d Cir. 1969), rehearing
",5

denied, 422 F.2d 38 (1970), petition for cert. filed, 38 U.S.L.W. 3348 (U.S.
Mar. 4, 1970); United States v. Pryba, 312 F. Supp. 466 (D.D.C. 1970);
Hosey v. City of Jackson, 309 F. Supp, 527 (S.D. Miss. 1970), appeal filed,
38 U.S.L.W. 3433 (U.S. Apr. 25, 1970); Rage Books, Inc. v. Leary, 301 F.
Supp. 546 (S.D.N.Y. 1969). See also United States v. One Carton Positive
Motion Picture Film Entitled "491," 367 F.2d 889 (2d Cir. 1966). In

Bazzell v. Gibbens, 306 F. Supp. 1057 (E.D. La. 1969) the court reasoned that
whether or not a prior adversary hearing was necessary depended upon the
nature and purpose of the seizure; if made for the purpose of destroying the
thing seized and for the purpose of preventing the dissemination of the
articles seized then such a hearing is mandated by the First Amendment.

However, the court concluded that where a single copy of a film is seized
for the sole purpose of preserving it for evidence in a criminal action, such
a seizure does not violate the First Amendment.
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ing.14 7 The court did caution, however, that based upon Kingsley,
a statute permitting seizures prior to an adversary hearing must

insure that such a hearing will follow within a brief specified
period. 1 8

However, this reasoning should be closely examined

for Kingsley did not involve a seizure at all but rather an injunction against sale. And Kingsley expressly forbid a seizure
14
until a judicial determination was made.
Another district court has held that under Lee Art, not only
is there no requirement for a hearing prior to the issuance of a
warrant for the seizure of a film, but that the only purpose for
the presence of the exhibitor and counsel at a required postseizure hearing is "to insure that the film viewed is the same as
that described in the affidavit and seized pursuant to the warrant." 5 0

However, these lower court interpretations and reliance
upon Lee Art are wholly inconsistent with the Supreme Court's
holdings in Marcus and Books. While both of these cases dealt
with seizures of books rather than motion pictures, the Court
stressed in both opinions the importance of an adversary pro1
ceeding to insure preservation of First Amendment rights."

Books and Marcus, read conj unctively, state that these rights can
not be adequately preserved unless the required adversary hear-

ing takes place before any restraint is imposed. 5 2 And Books
expressly stated that a subsequent hearing would not cure the
procedural defect of failing to hold an adversary proceeding before the warrant authorizing the seizure was issued. 153

The great

majority of courts have chosen to follow the rationale of Books,
and have applied its dictates to films as well as printed publica-

tions. 15 ' These cases support the proposition that before a warrant can issue authorizing the wholesale seizure of allegedly ob-

scene films, an adversary hearing on the question of obscenity
147

Merritt v. Lewis, 309 F. Supp. 1249 (E.D. Cal. 1970).

148 Id. at 1255.

189 354 U.S. 436, 445 (1957).
150 309 F. Supp. at 1255.
151 "The requirement of an adversary hearing prior to seizing allegedly
obscene material is completely derived from the First Amendment's right
of free speech. United States v. Manarite, 314 F. Supp. 607, 610 (S.D.N.Y.
1970). But see Gregory v. DiFlorio, 298 F. Supp. 1360, 1363 (W.D.N.Y.
1969), which seems to rely on the Fourth Amendment as the basis for a
prior adversary hearing.
152 Many courts cite Marcus as authority for the proposition that a
prior adversary hearing is a requirement of procedural due process. Cambist Films, Inc. v. Duggan, 420 F.2d 687, 689 (3d Cir. 1969); HMH Publishing Co. v. Oldham, 306 F. Supp. 495 496 (M.D. Fla. 1969); Gregory v.
DiFlorio, 298 F. Supp. 1360, 1363 (W.D.N.Y. 1969).
158 378 U.S. at 210.
24 Bethview Amusement Corp. v. Cahn, 416 F.2d 410 (2d Cir. 1969);
Tyrone, Inc. v. Wilkinson, 410 F.2d 639 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S.
985, (1969) ; Metzger v. Pearcy 393 F.2d 202 (7th Cir. 1968) ; Morrison v.
Wilson, 307 F. Supp. 196 (N.B. Fla. 1969) ; Delta Book Distributors, Inc.
v. Cronvich, 304 F. Supp. 662 (E.D. La. 1969); Sokolic v. Ryan, 304 F.
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must be held. The very purpose of the hearing is to provide the
sensitive tools to determine the protected nature of the material
before imposition of substantial restraints. 155 It has been held that
the judge's viewing of the film, without holding a prior adversary
hearing, cannot provide these sensitive tools and satisfy the requirement of the First Amendment for an adversary hearing. 1 6
Despite the government's persistent argument that Books should
be limited to the seizures of printed publications, and not films,
all three Courts of Appeals which have considered Books' application to films have held that a prior adversary hearing is re157
quired.
While the courts, for the most part, have refused to give any
importance to the dictum in Lee Art, several have recognized the
validity of the government's contention that if a film is not
seized, the exhibitor may delete sections of it which are crucial
to the government's case. 158 Therefore, most decisions requiring
an adversary hearing prior to seizure have added the requirement
suggested in the Seventh Circuit's holding in Metzger v.
Pearcy. 59 In that case the Circuit Court of Appeals ordered that
the seized film be returned to the exhibitor for there was not an
adversary hearing prior to the issuance of the warrant. However, the court stated that the exhibitor would be required to
furnish the court with a copy of the film, uncut, for the purpose
of preserving it for criminal prosecution. 60 Other courts have
held similarly that the exhibitor must make the film, or prints of
Supp. 213 (S.D. Ga. 1969); Central Agency, Inc. v. Brown 306 F. Supp.
502 (N.D. Ga. 1969); Fontaine v. Dial, 303 F. Supp. 436 (W.). Tex. 1969);
Cambist Films, Inc. v. Illinois, 292 F. Supp. 185 (N.D. Ill. 1968); United
States v. Brown, 274 F. Supp. 561 (S.D.N.Y. 1967) ; Carter v. Gautier, 305
F. Supp. 1098 (M.D. Ga. 1969); Carroll v. City of Orlando, 311 F. Supp.
967 (M.D. Fla. 1970) ; Potwora v. Dillon, 386 F.2d 74 (2d Cir. 1967)
(dictum); Gregory v. DiFlorio, 298 F. Supp. 1360 (W.D.N.Y. 1969) ; Miske
v. Spicola, 314 F. Supp. 962 (M.D. Fla. 1969).
15 United States v. Alexander, 428 F.2d 1169, 1174 (1970).
156 Bethview Amusement Corp. v. Cahn, 416 F.2d 410, 412 (2d Cir. 1969).
157 Bethview Amusement Corp. v. Cahn, 416 F.2d 410 (2d Cir. 1969);
Tyrone, Inc. v. Wilkinson, 410 F.2d 639 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S.
985 (1969) ; Metzger v. Pearcy, 393 F.2d 202 (7th Cir. 1968).
158
It seems ludicrous to suggest that apprehension of suspected
criminals and their unsavory wares requires adversary court proceedings to stamp the contents as probably obscene. . . . While this sort
of scene is being enacted . . . the evidence could be consumed . . . or
destroyed . . . or . . . the itinerant hucksters will . . . have flown the

coop.
Rage Books, Inc. v. Leary, 301 F. Supp. 546, 549 (S.D.N.Y. 1969). And other
courts have held that since the material is needed for criminal prosecution;
a hearing need not be held. United States v. Wild, 422 F.2d 34 (2d Cir.
1969), rehearing denied, 422 F.2d 34 (1970), petition for cert. filed, 38
U.S.L.W. 3348 (U.S. Mar. 4 1970) ; Merritt v. Lewis, 309 F. Supp. 1249
(E.D. Cal. 1970); Hosey v. City of Jackson, 309 F. Supp. 527 (S.D. Miss.
1970), appeal filed, 38 U.S.L.W. 3433 (U.S. Apr. 25, 1970); Bazzell v.
Gibbens, 306 F. Supp. 1057 (E.D. La. 1969); Rage Books, Inc. v. Leary,
301 F. Supp. 546 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
159393 F.2d 202 (7th Cir. 1968).
160 Id. at 204.
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it, available upon the government's request, so that the prosecutor may prepare his case. 16 '
Incidental to seizures of allegedly obscene material is the
arrest of the disseminator. It has been urged successfully in
some lower federal courts that the First Amendment forbids arrest of a purveyor of allegedly obscene material until there has
1
been a judicial determination of the nature of the materials. 2
It has been pointed out that the material may be purchased by an

officer acting as an ordinary customer, who can present the material to the court in an adversary proceeding. 16 3 If the court
finds the material to be obscene, then, and only then, should the
person who sold the officer the material be arrested.6 4 Other
courts have rejected this notion entirely and have held that the
arrest of an exhibitor of an allegedly obscene film, be it the theater's owner, manager, or projectionist, prior to a final judicial
determination does not violate the First Amendment1 65 These
courts simply rely on a showing of "probable cause," which does
not seem to be consistent with the other strict requirements the
161 United States v. Alexander, 428 F.2d 1169 (8th Cir. 1970); Tyrone,
Inc. v. Wilkinson, 410 F.2d 639 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 985 (1969).
(E.D.
162 See New Orleans Book Mart, Inc. v. Garrison, No. 69-2521
La., Dec. 31, 1969) (enjoining police from further arrests before a prior
adversary hearing had been held) ; Sokolic v. Ryan, 304 F. Supp. 213 (S.D.
Ga. 1969) (ordering restoration of petitioner's business license which had
been revoked without a prior adversary hearing) ; City News Center, Inc. v.
Carson, 298 F. Supp. 706 (M.D. Fla. 1969) (the court issued an order
restraining defendants from making arrests without first holding,-with due
notice, a judicially supervised adversary hearing on the issue of obscenity).
In Bee See Books, Inc. v. Leary, 291 F. Supp. 622 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), the court
enjoined the defendant police commissioner from continually stationing a
uniformed policeman in the plaintiff's bookstore as an unconstitutional
restraint under the first and fourteenth amendments. The court interpreted
Books as requiring an adversary hearing prior to the application of any
restraints upon dissemination. Id. at 625. However all the above cases
precede Milky Way Productions Inc. v. Leary, 305 F. Supp. 288 (S.D.N.Y.
1969) aff'd sub nom. New York Peed Co. v. Leary, 397 U.S. 98 (1970), where
the court held that the arrest of a purveyor of obscene material prior to a
determination of obscenity does not violate the First Amendment. Id. at
295-97.
163 Purchase may prove useful in obtaining evidence in cases involving
stag films since most producers do not invest enough to make it worth their
while to obey an order prohibiting destruction of the material. However, the
court in Rage Books, Inc. v. Leary, 301 F. Supp. 546 (S.D.N.Y. 1969), rejected this method feeling that there was no need to "fill the coffers of smut
peddlers." Id. at 549. This method is not practical in those cases involving
major film productions, where the cost of purchase is prohibitive.
164 Delta Book Distributors v. Cronvich, 304 F. Supp. 662, 667 (E.D.
La. 1969), where Justice Boyle stated that it was irresistible in logic and
law that prior restraint through seizure of the allegedly obscene material
or arrest of the alleged offender may be constitutionally undertaken prior
to an adversary adjudication.
165 See Pinkus v. Arnebergh, 258 F. Supp. 996 (C.D. Cal. 1966) (arrest
of exhibitor does not violate first amendment) ; cf. Milky Way Productions,
Inc. v. Leary, 305 F. Supp. 288, 295-97 (S.D.N.Y. 1969) aff'd sub nom.
New York Feed Co. v. Leary, 397 U.S. 98 (1970) ; Rage Books, Inc. v. Leary,
301 F. Supp. 546, 549 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
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Court has laid down to prevent an inhibition of First Amendment
rights.
In order to establish criminal liability, the government has
the burden of proving that the defendant had knowledge of the
contents of the allegedly obscene material, 6 6 to the extent that
such knowledge constitutes scienter. It must, therefore, be
shown that the defendant knew, to some degree, the illegal character of the material. In Smith v. California,167 the Court found
that a statute making the sale of obscene material a crime without requiring scienter, was inharmonious with the guarantees of
the First Amendment:
If the bookseller is criminally liable without knowledge of the contents he will tend to restrict the books he sells to those he has inspected; and thus the State will have imposed a restriction upon
the distribution
of constitutionally protected as well as obscene
8
literature. e

In Mishkin v. New York 69 a state statute was upheld which
required that the defendant be "in some manner aware of the
character of the material" so that only a "calculated purveyance
170
of filth" was prohibited.
Although, the Supreme Court has stated that a conviction
for the sale of obscene material must require knowledge of the
contents, in Smith it expressly refused to determine what
amount of knowledge must be shown. 17' Several state and lower
federal courts, however, have ruled that there are circumstances
which make it incumbent upon the defendant to inquire further
into the contents of the material, and that proof of the existence
of these circumstances may be substituted for proof of actual
knowledge of the contents. Among these circumstances are: 1)
the "erotic," "lurid," or "vile" titles of the books ;172 2) "obscene," "smutty" or "blatant" pictures on the covers of the
books ;173 3) the advertising and other material promoting the
book ;174 4) complaints received by the defendant that the material he was selling was "filthy" ;17, 5) the fact that the supplier
from whom the material was obtained was a dealer in erotic
166 Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147 (1959).
167 Id.
168 Id. at 153.
169 383 U.S. 502 (1966).

170Mid. at 503.
See also Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 443-45
(1967) ; Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 520 (1947).

171 361 U.S. at 154.

172 United States v. Hochman 277 F.2d 631 (7th Cir. 1960) ; City of
Cincinnati v. Coy, 115 Ohio App. 478, 182 N.E.2d 628 (1962).
173 People v. Harris, 192 Cal. App. 2d 887, 13 Cal. Rptr. 642 (Super. Ct.
App. Dept. 1961) ; People v. Sikora, 32 Ill. 2d 260, 204 N.E.2d 768 (1965).
174 State v. Jungelaus, 176 Neb. 641, 126 N.W.2d 858 (1964).
175 People v. Williamson, 207 Cal. App. 2d 839, 24 Cal. Rptr. 734 (Dist.
Ct. App. 1962), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 994 (1964).
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books. 17 6 One state court has even held that the fact that the

defendant knew that other booksellers in the area had been arrested for selling the same book placed him on notice of the character of the book, and he assumed the risk that the court would

find it obscene.

17
LEGISLATIVE CONTROL

Operating on the premise that Roth and its progeny mean
that the First and Fourteenth Amendments recognize a valid
governmental interest in regulating obscenity, every state has enacted legislation to control dissemination of obscene material. 1 8
All the states, with the exception of New Mexico, 1 79 have sought
state-wide control of obscenity through criminal statutes designed to suppress commerce in obscene materials. Consequently,

transporting obscene material into a state for commercial distribution is unlawful,8 0 as well as possessing obscene literature
with the intent to distribute it commercially. 81 Many states pro176 State v. Cercone, 2 Conn. Cir. 144 196 A.2d 439 (App. Div. 1963);
State v. Onorato, 2 Conn. Cir. 428, 199 A.2d 715 (App. Div. 1963).
177 Yudkin v. State, 229 Md. 223, 182 A.2d 798 (1962). The Supreme
Court of Maryland reversed the conviction of a bookdealer on the ground
that the trial court had erred in refusing to admit expert testimony on the
issue of obscenity. While considering that issue, however, the court noted
that booksellers in the same area had been arrested for selling the same
book and that defendant had actual knowledge of such arrests. As a result,
the court concluded that "the defendant, though he had some doubt as to
whether the book could be banned, chose to take the risk that a court would
not declare it to be obscene," and that his conviction could not, therefore, be
reversed on the ground of belief in the nonobscenity of the material. See
also United States v. Oakley, 290 F.2d 517 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S.
888 (1961) in which the Sixth Circuit sustained a federal conviction for
sending photographs of nude women through the mails. The defense of
belief in the nonobscenity of the materials was rejected by the Court in the
following words:
From his experience with these matters, [defendant] was persuaded, he
says, that his enterprise was not illegal, and criminal intent was absent
...[but it] was for the jury here, under proper instructions and a pplying 'contemporary community standards' in the context of defendant's
conduct, to determine his guilt.
Id. at 519.
178 Notes 2 through 6 supra. See generally McCarty, Obscenity from
Stanley to Karlexis: A Back Door Approach to First Amendment Protection,
23 VAND. L. REV. 369 (1970).
179 New Mexico has failed to enact state statutes, but vests control in
local municipalities. N.M. STAT. ANN. §14-17-14 (1953). Several states,
in addition to state laws, give local governments regulatory powers: e.g.
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 24, §11-5-1 (1969); N.D. CENT. CODE §40-05-01 (1968);
S.D. COMPILED LAws ANN. §22-24-25 (Supp. 1970).
180 ALA. CODE tit. 14, §374(4) (1) (Supp. 1967) ; ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN.
§13-532(2) (Supp. 1969); GA. CODE ANN. §26-6301 (Supp. 1968); HAWAII
REV. STAT. §727-8 (1959); KAN. STAT. ANN. §21-1102 (1964); MASs. ANN.
LAWS ch. 272 §§28A, 28B (1968); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, §418 (Supp.
1968) ;Miss. ODE ANN. §2674-03 (Supp. 1970); N.D. CENT. CODE §12-21-09
(1960); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21 §1040.13 (Supp. 1970-71); R.I. GEN.
LAws ANN. §11-31-1 (Supp. 1969); §.C. CODE ANN. §16-414.1 (Supp. 1970);
S.D. COMPILED LAWs ANN. §22-24-24 (Supp. 1970); TEX. PEN. CODE ANN.
art. 527, §3 (Supp. 1970-71); W. VA. CODE ANN. §61-8-11 (1966); Wis.
STAT. ANN. §944.21(1) (a) (1958).
is' ALA. CODE tit. 14, §374(4) (1) (Supp. 1967) ; ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN.
§13-532(3) (Supp. 1969-70); CONN. GEN. STAT. REv. §58-243 (1968); DEL.

19711

Obscenity Regulation

18 2
hibit the buying of obscene materials with the intent to sell,
while others prohibit preparation, display, sale, offer for sale, or

any other distribution. 18 3 Most jurisdictions have statutory provisions prohibiting sale or distribution of erotica to young persons. 84 Many of these youth statutes are closely patterned after
the New York statute upheld in Ginsburg v. New York.'1' These
statutes usually adopt the tri-part6 Memoirs test, adapted for
CODE ANN. tit. 11, §711 (1953) ; D.C. CODE ANN. §22-2001 (a) (1) (E) (Supp.
1, 1968); HAWAII REV. LAWS §727-8 (1959); IOWA CODE ANN. §725.5 (1950);
KAN. STAT. ANN. §21-1102 (1964); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §14:106 (West
Supp. 1969); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, §418 (Supp. 1969); MASS. ANN. LAWS
ch. 272, §§28A, 28B (1968) ; MICH. STAT. ANN. §28.575(1) (Supp. 1969);

MISS. CODE ANN. §2674-03 (Supp. 1968); NE.

REV. STAT. §28-921 (1964) ;

NEV. REV. STAT. §201.250(2) (1967); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §571-A:2 (Supp.
1969); N.J. STAT. ANN. §2A:115-2 (1969); N.Y. PENAL LAW §235.05
(McKinney Supp. 1969-70); N.D. CENT. CODE §12-21-09 (1960); OKLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 21, §1040.13 (Supp. 1969-70); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, §4524(a)
(Supp. 1969); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. §11-31-1 (Supp. 1967); S.C. CODE ANN.
§16-414.2 (Supp. 1968) ; TEX. PEN. CODE ANN. art. 527, §3 (Supp. 1969-70) ;
UTAH CODE ANN. §76-39-5-(3) (Supp. 1969); VA. CODE ANN. §18.1-228(4)
Supp. 1968); W. VA. CODE ANN. §61-8-11 (1966); WYO. STAT. ANN. §6-103
Supp. 1969).
182E.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. REV. §53-243 (1968); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch.
272, §§28A, 28B (1968); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. §11-31-10 (Supp. 1969);
UTAH CODE ANN. §76-39-5 (Supp. 1969); W. VA. CODE ANN. §61-8-11 (1966).
183ALA.
CODE tit. 14, §374(4) (1)
(Supp. 1967) ; ALASKA STAT.
§§11.40.160, 11.40.170 (1962); ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. §13352(1) (2) (Supp.
1969); ARK. STAT. ANN. §§41-2729, 41-2731 (Supp. 1967) ; DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 11, §711 (1953) ; D.C. CODE ANN. §22-2001 (a) (1) (A) (Supp. 1, 1968) ;
FLA. STAT. ANN. §847.011(1) (a) (1965); GA. CODE ANN. §26-6301 (Supp.
1968); HAWAII REV. STAT. §727-8 (1959); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 39, §11-20
Smith-Hurd Supp. 1969); IND. ANN. STAT. §10-2803 (Supp. 1968); IOWA
ODE ANN. §725.6 (1950) ; KAN. STAT. ANN. §21-1102 (1964)i MASS. ANN.

LAWS ch. 272, §§28A, 28B (1968); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, §2901 (1964);
MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, §418 (Supp. 1968); MICH. STAT. ANN. §28.575(1)
(Supp. 1969); MINN. STAT. ANN. §617.241 (1964); Miss. CODE ANN.
§2674-03 (Supp. 1968); Mo. ANN. STAT. §563.280 (Supp. 1968-69); MONT.
REV. CODES ANN. §94-3603 (1947); NEB. REV. STAT. §21 (1964); N.Y.
PENAL LAW §§235.00(4) (1967) (Definition of promotion), 235.05 (Supp.
N.D. CENT. CODE §12-21-09 (1960); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
1969-70);
§2905.34 (Baldwin 1964) ; OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, §§1040.13, 1040.51
(Supp. 1969-70); ORE. REV. STAT. §167.151(1)

(1967); PA. STAT. ANN. tit.

18, §4524(a) (Supp. 1969); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. §11-31-1 (Supp. 1967);
S.D. COMPILED

LAWS ANN. §22-24-12

(Supp. 1969); TENN. CODE ANN.

§39-3004 (Supp. 1968) ; TEX. PEN. CODE ANN. art. 527 §3 (Supp. 1969-70) ;
UTAH CODE ANN. §76-39-5(3) (Supp. 1969); VA. CODE ANN. §18.1-228(1),
(2),

(3)

(1968); W. VA. CODE ANN. §61-8-11 (1966); WIS. STAT. ANN.

§944.21(1) (a) (1958); WYo. STAT. ANN. §6-103 (Supp. 1969).
184E.g., S.C. CODE ANN. §16-414.3 (Supp. 1968); S.D. COMPILED LAWS
ANN. §22-24-13 (Supp. 1969); UTAH CODE ANN. §76-39-5(6), (8) (Supp.
1969); VT. STAT. ANN tit 13 §2802 (Supp. 1969).
185 390 U.S. 629 (1968), The statute provides:
A prson is guilty of disseminating indecent material to minors when:
1. With knowledge of its character and content, he sells or loans to a
minor for monetary considerations:
(a) Any picture, photograph, drawing, sculpture, motion picture
film, or similar visual representation or image of a person or portion
of the human body which depicts nudity, sexual conduct or sado-masochistic abuse and which is harmful to minors; or
(b) Any book, pamphlet, magazine, printed matter however reproduced, or sound recording which contains any matter enumerated in
paragraph (a) hereof, or explicit and detailed verbal descriptions or
narrative accounts of sexual excitement, sexual conduct or sado-masochistic abuse and which, taken as a whole, is harmful to minors; or
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youth, as a test of what is "harmful to minors."'186 Utah, in a
recent enactment, has made it illegal to sell or offer for sale,
"hard-core pornography," which is defined as material "that
shows people, or people and animals in actual genital contact of
any kind."'187 In the state of Washington, it is illegal to sell material which is labelled "Adults Only" to minors. 8
In addition,

many states make unlawful the hiring or employing of minors to
sell or assist in selling or distributing obscene materials. 8

9

Although since Stanley, "mere possession [of obscenity]
cannot constitutionally be a crime,"' 190 possession can lead to
prosecution for related offenses. Prosecution may result from
possession with intent to show or introduce obscene material into
any family.191 In many states possession of a statutory number

of obscene items creates a rebuttable presumption of possession
with intent to sell, lend, give away or show, 9 ' thereby subjecting
2. Knowing the character and content of a motion picture, show or other
presentation which in whole or in part, depicts nudity, sexual conduct
or sado-masochistic abuse, and which is harmful to minors, he:
(a) Exhibits such motion picture, show or other presentation to a
minor for a monetary consideration; or
(b) Sells to a minor an admission ticket or pass to premises whereon
there is exhibited or to be exhibited such motion picture, show or other
presentation; or
(c) Admits a minor for a monetary consideration to premises whereon
there is exhibited or to be exhibited such motion picture, show or other
presentation.
Disseminating indecent material to minors is a class A misdemeanor.
Added L. 1965, C. 327, eff. Sept. 1, 1965.
186 N.Y. PENAL LAW §235-20 (McKinney 1967):
'Harmful to minors' means that quality of any description or representation, in whatever form, of nudity, sexual conduct, sexual excitement, or
sado-masochistic abuse, when it:
(a) Predominantly appeals to the prurient, shameful or morbid interest of minors; and
(b) Is patently offensive to prevailing standards in the community
as a whole with respect to what is suitable material for minors; and
(c) Is utterly without redeeming social importance for minors.
Added L. 1967, (c) 791, §34, eff. Sept. 1, 1967.
'87 UTAH PENAL CODE ch. 242, §76-39-5 (1950)
as amended ch. 264,
§76-39-5 (8) (1967).
188 Ch. 256, §14(3a), 2 (1969) WASH. SEss. LAws.
189 E.g. ALA. CODE tit. 14 §374 (16a-16i)
(Supp. 1969), where a minor
is under eighteen; N.Y. PENAL LAW §235.21 (McKinney Supp. 1970), where
a minor is under 17; PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, §4524(b), (c)
(Supp.
1970), where a minor is under 17.
190 Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
191 ALA. CODE tit. 14, §374 (4) (1) (Supp. 1967); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN.
§13-532(2) (Supp. 1969); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §40-9-17(1) (1963);
CONN. GEN. STAT. REV. §53-243 (1968) ; DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, §711 (1953) ;
FLA. STAT. ANN. §847.011(1) (a) (1965); GA. CODE ANN. §26.2101 (Supp.
1969); HAWAII REV. STAT. §727-8 (1959); IND. ANN. STAT. §10-2803 (Supp.
1969); IOWA CODE ANN. §725.5 (1950); KAN. STAT. ANN. §21-1102 (1964);
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17 §2901 (1964); MICH. STAT. ANN. §28.575(1)
(Supp. 1969) ; MINN. STAT. ANN. §617.241 (1964); Mo. ANN. STAT. §563.280
(Supp. 1969-70); NEB. REV. STAT. §28-921 (1964); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§2A:115-2 (1969) ; N.D. CENT. CODE §12-21-09 (1960); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§2905.34 (Baldwin 1964) ; PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, §4524(a) (Supp. 1969);
WYO. STAT. ANN. §6-103 (Supp. 1969).
192 E.g., ALA. CODE. tit. 14, §374(15)
(Supp. 1967); ARK. STAT. ANN.
§41-2727 (1964); FLA. STAT. ANN. §847.011(1)(b) (1965); MICH. STAT.
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the defendant to a more severe penalty.9 3 Some states make it a
misdemeanor to deposit, or cause to be deposited, any obscene material in the mail, or with a common carrier.11 Some states even
make it illegal to furnish information as to where, when, how, or
from whom, obscene materials can be obtained." 5
Although the states seem to have a disposition toward criminal prosecution as a vehicle for a determination of obscenity, 5'
an in rem procedure, such as developed by Massachusetts, may
be more advantageous. The Massachusetts statute permits the
Commonwealth to bring an in rem proceeding against any book
to determine its status.' 7 The distributor or publisher may appear and defend the book, 19 thereby obtaining a penalty-free determination of the protected nature of the book. This procedure
is more desirable than criminal prosecution, although there is one
significant drawback. The statute expressly provides that in any
criminal prosecution for a sale after the in rem proceeding, the
defendant is "conclusively presumed" to have knowledge that
the book is obscene. 99 This would seem to foreclose the bookseller from selling any book he believed protected, as he could
not raise the question of the protected nature of the material,
once the in rem proceeding was concluded. This seems to be in
direct conflict with the reasoning in Smith v. California,200 for

there the Court held that in order for a criminal statute to be
constitutional, the statute had to include a requirement of scienter, so that a bookseller would not be discouraged from selling
201
controversial books.

ANN. §28.575(1) (Supp. 1969); MISS. CODE ANN. §2764-15 (Supp. 1968);
N.Y. PENAL LAW §235.10(2) (McKinney 1967); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21,
§1040.24 (Supp. 1969-70).
193Compare ALA. CODE tit. 14, §374(4) (1) (Supp. 1967) (maximum
fine of $2,000 or 1 year inprison, or both), with ALA. CODE tit.
14 §374 (4) (2)
(Supp. 1967) (maximum fine of $500 or 6 months in jail, or both). Compare
ARK. STAT. ANN. §41-2731(1) (Supp. 1969) (a felony offense) with ARK.
STAT. ANN. §41-2731 (Supp. 1969) (a misdemeanor, a maximum fine of
$1,000 or maximum 1 year in county jail, or both).
194E.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. §617.26 (1964); Mo. ANN. STAT. §563.29
(1953); NEB. REV. STAT. §28-922 (1964); WYo. STAT. ANN. §6-104 (Supp.
1969).
195E.g., Mo. ANN. STAT. §563.280 (Supp. 1969-70); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§2A:115-2 (1969); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §2905.34 (Baldwin 1964); PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 18, §4524(a) (Supp. 1969); WYO. STAT. ANN. §6-103 (Supp.
1969).
'19See, e.g., Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 69-70 (1963).
197 MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 272, §28H (1959).
'98 §28D provides that "Any person interested in the sale, loan or
distribution o said book may appear and file an answer .... "
See Smith v. Cali'99 MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 272, §28H (1959).
fornia, 361 U.S. 147 (1959) for a discussion of the constitutionality of
liability of retailers without knowledge of the contents of the material.
200 361 U.S. 147 (1959).
201 See text accompanying notes 167 through 177 supra for a complete
discussion of Smith v. California.
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Other jurisdictions have adopted declaratory judgment actions providing for a statutory notice of the pending litigation to
all known, interested persons. In a recent enactment, the Georgia legislature included a written notice requirement from the
district attorney, stating that he had determined the matter obscene and any person receiving such notice had thirty days to file
22
for declaratory relief. 0
Some states provide for injunctions, in rem, against the particular material,203 requiring that the complaint designate all persons known to have a commercial interest in the matter. Other
states provide for in personam injunctions against individuals
connected with the matter. 20 4 While most injunction statutes empower only the State's Attorney to institute injunctive proceedings, in Kentucky any citizen may commence the action. 20 5 In
Colorado, private citizens may compel the District Attorney to
206
act with a mandamus proceeding.
In addition to this extensive state control, the federal government has imposed several restraints, where its interest appears marginal at best. 20 7 Although the power of censorship has
never been explicitly given to the Postmaster General, and it is
doubtful whether any such power was intended except as an incident to an arrest, 20 8 a system of administrative censorship has
developed.209 Prior to 1971, 39 U.S.C. §4006210 permitted the
Postmaster General, or his agents, to make a finding on "evidence
satisfactory to [him]," that a person was obtaining or seeking
money through the mails for "an obscene . . . matter" or was
using the mails to distribute information about where such articles might be obtained. The statute permitted him, upon this
finding, to stamp "unlawful" upon the letters addressed to that
person and return them to the mailer, as well as prohibit the
payment of money orders for the material. Under department
regulations, a judicial officer held a hearing and rendered an
opinion with "all due speed," from which there was an adminis202

GA. CODE ANN.

§40-3107(a)

(1970).

E.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 272, §28H (1969). See text accompanying notes 197 through 200 supra for a discussion of the statute's
operation.
2 04
203

E.g., N.Y. PENAL LAW §235.05 (McKinney 1967).

205 KEN. REV. STAT.
206 COLO. REV. STAT.

§436.101 (1966).
§40-9-21 (1963).

See Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 503-05 (1957) (Harlan, J.,
dissenting). For a detailed survey of the Postal System see Note, Project:
207

Poet Offlice, 41 S. CAL. L. REv. 643 (1968).
208 CONG. GLOBE, 42 Cong., 3d Sess., App. 168 (1873).

209 This development is due largely to legislative silence after an 1890
Attorney General's opinion, 19 Op. Att'y Gen. 667 (1890). And the courts
assumed such a power was possessed. See, e.g., American Mercury v. Keely,
19 F.2d 295, 297 (2d Cir. 1927); Anderson v. Patten, 247 F. 382, 384 (2d
Cir. 1917).
2109 U.S.C. §4006 (1964),
now 39 U.S.C. §3006, Postal Reorganization
Act, 84 Stat. 719, 747-48.
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trative appeal. 2 11 39 U.S.C. §4007212 permitted the district courts
to order the defendant's incoming mail detained pending completion of the §4006 proceedings, merely upon showing of "probable
cause" that §4006 was being violated.2 13 Both statutes were held
unconstitutional recently in a combined decision in Blount v. The
Mail Box, and United States v. Book Bin.2 '
In Mail Box, the
appellee, a retail magazine distributor, against whom the Postmaster General had instituted §4006 proceedings, 215 sought declaratory and injunctive relief in the federal district court. 16
In Book Bin, the Postmaster General applied for a §4007 order,
to which the appellee counterclaimed successfully.2 1 7 The Court
held in a unanimous decision that §4006, and §4007 were unconstitutional because they violated the First Amendment by failing
to provide procedures which include "built-in safeguards against
s
curtailment of constitutionally protected expression .... ,,2
Using Freedman v. Maryland21 9 and the procedural requirements
211 Proceedings under §4006 are governed by departmental regulations.
A proceeding is begun in the General Counsel of the Post Office Department
by written complaint and notice of hearing. A Judicial Officer holds a
hearing and renders an opinion which includes findings of fact and reasons
upon which the decision was based. 39 C.F.R. §§952.5-952.25. Under the
Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§551-59 (1966), the accused is
guaranteed certain procedural safeguards:
(1) a complaint stating facts sufficient to enable him to answer,
39 C.F.R. §952.5 (1967) ; (2) representation by counsel, 39 C.F.R. §952.16
(1967) ; (3) opportunity for continuances and extensions 'for good cause
shown,' 39 C.F.R. §952.13 (1967); (4) opportunity to file depositions,
39 C.F.R. 952.21 (1967) ; (5) hearing in front of an examiner independent of the agency involved, 39 C.F.R. §952.17 (1967) ; (6) application
of the rules of evidence, 39 C.F.R. §952.18 (1967) ; (7) opportunity to
obtain an official transcript of the record, 39 C.F.R. §952.22 (1967) ; (8)
opportunity to present proposed findings of fact, 39 C.F.R. §952.23
(1967); (9) opportunity to move for a reconsideration, 39 C.F.R.
§952.27 (1967).
212 39 U.S.C. §4007 (1964),
now 39 U.S.C. §3007, Postal Reorganization
Act, 84 Stat. 719, 747-48.
21.Prior to 1956, interim impounding orders were issued without
statutory authority. In partial response to judicial unfriendliness to such
interim detention of mail, Standard v. Oleson, 74 S.Ct. 768 (1954), the
Postmaster General sought and obtained the power to impose a twenty-day
interim mail lock, subject to extension by the district court. Act of July 27,
1956, ch. 755, 70 Stat. 699. Postmaster Genera] Summerfield in 1959 sought
to broaden Post Office power to seize mail. See H.R. 7379, 86th Cong., 1st
and 2d Sess. (1959-1960). Instead, Congress stripped the Postmaster General of his power to issue an interim mail block for any period, by enactment
of §4007 which required him to seek relief in a federal district court.
214 400 U.S. 410 (1971).
215 Id. The Postmaster General began administrative proceedings under
§4006 on November 1, 1968, and the hearing was concluded on December 5,
1968. The Judicial Officer filed his opinion on December 31, 1968, with a
finding that the magazines were obscene and entered a §4006 order 61 days
after the complaint was filed. Id. at 415.
216 306 F. Supp. 634 (1969).
A three judge district court was convened
pursuant to 22 U.S.C. §2284 in the District Court in the City of Los Angeles,
California.
217 306 F. Supp. 634 (1969). Cf. Lamont v. Postmaster General, 381 U.S.

301 (1965).
218

219

400 U.S. at 422.
380 U.S. 51 (1965).

The Court stated that its decision in Freedman
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set forth therein, the Court found: a) that the administrative
censorship scheme created by §4006 and §4007 did not require
governmentally initiated judicial participation, or assure prompt
judicial review ;220 b) that the power given the Postmaster General under §4007 to apply for a court order to impound the mail
did not cure the defects in §4006 since it is only a discretionary
procedure and the requirement for prompt judicial review was
not satisfied by a "probable cause" finding, 22 1 and c) that §4007
failed to provide for a preservation of "the status quo for the
shortest period compatible with sound judicial discretion.

'222

Although, §§4006 and 4007 are no longer available to the
Post Office, §1461 of 18 UNITED STATES

CoDE,

popularly known as

the Comstock Act 223 provides criminal penalties for those who
knowingly use the mails for mailing or delivery of obscene macompels the conclusion which the three-judge court reached that the administrative procedures "omit those 'sensitive tools' essential to satisfy the
requirements
of the First Amendment." Id. at 418.
2
2 0 Id. The Court noted that this administrative scheme did differ from
the Maryland procedure involved in Freedman in that under the Maryland
scheme, the picture could not be exhibited until the conclusion of the pending
hearing, while under §4006 the order to return the mail or not pay the
postal money order is not made until the hearing is completed with a
determination that the magazines are obscene. Id. at 418-19. But, this
distinction did not "redress the fatal flaw" of the procedure requiring the
distributor to assume the burden of initiating judicial proceedings. Id. at 416.
221

Id. at 419-21.

Id. at 421, relying on Freedman v. Maryland, 880 U.S. 51, 58 (1965).
It is interesting to note that in note 8 of the decision the Court included the
following:
This provision was added at the request of Postmaster General
Summerfield who desired it expressly to forestall judicial review pending completion of the administrative proceeding. 'This would guarantee that counsel for a mailer will not be able to raise successfully a
bar to all further administrative proceedings in a case in which the
Government failed to prevail on its motion for a preliminary injunction.'
Letter from Arthur E. Summerfield, Postmaster General, to Senator Olin
D. Johnston Chairman, Senate Committee on Post Office and Civil
Service, U..
Code Cong. and Ad. News, 86th Cong. 2d Sess. 3249
(1960).
In 1959, Postmaster General Summerfield had testified:
'In spite of the frustrations and legal complications and even the
court decisions [which the Postmaster General had described as handing
down "very broad definitions of obscenity"] I feel a responsibility to the
public to attempt to prevent the use of the mails for indecent material,
and to seek indictments and prosecutions for such offenses, even though
it may be argued that it falls in the category of material concerning
which there have been previous rulings favorable to promoters.' Hearings on Obscene Matter Sent Through the Mail before the Subcommittee
on Postal Operations of the House Committee on Post Office and Civil
Service, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 6-7 (1959).
Id. at 420 n.8.
223 Making the obscenity statute his personal endeavor, Anthony Coinstock brought the first radical change to the postal laws in 1873, while
Attorney General.
See Act of March 3, 1873, ch. 257, §148, 17 Stat. 598. For a history
of the colorful life of this champion of Victorian ideas see generally: W.
222

TRUMBULL, ANTHONY

COMSTOCK, FIGHTER

(1913); A.

BROWN

& J.

LEECH,

ANTHONY COMSTOCK, ROUNDSMAN OF THE LORD (1927).
The result of his
efforts was a substantial expansion of proscribed material.
The present statute is even more expansive:
Every obscene, lewd, lascivious, indecent, filthy or vile article,
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terial. 224

The power of this statute has been diluted by various

judicial decisions, which require that the materials not only meet
the statutory standards of "lewd, obscene, [etc.]", but that they
also satisfy the three elements of Memoirs,2 2 5 and are not considered a "classic. ' 226 Also, it has been held that the statute is

not applicable to obscene literature used for scientific or professional purposes. 22 7 In addition, the Justice Department has
stated that it intends to limit prosecutions to "those cases involving repeated offenders or other circumstances which may fairly
be described as aggravated. 2 2 8 The most far-reaching decision,
however, is the case of United States v. Dellapia,22 91 which found
that in light of Stanley v. Georgia,230 which permits private pos-

session of obscene materials in the home, §1461 could no longer
231
apply to private correspondence between consenting adults.

In addition to punishment for interstate traffic in obscene
material, 23 2 §1305 of the Tariff Act prohibits importation of obmatter, thing, device, or substance; and Every article or thing designed, adapted, or intended for preventing conception or producing abortion, or for any indecent or immoral
use; and
Every article, instrument, substance, drug, medicine, or thing which
is advertised or described in a manner calculated to lead another to use
or apply it for preventing conception or producing abortion, or for any
indecent or immoral purpose; and
Every written or printed card, letter, circular, book, pamphlet, advertisement, or notice of any kind giving information, directly or indirectly, where, or how, or from whom, or by what means any of such
mentioned matters, articles, or things may be obtained or made, or
where or by whom any act or operation of any kind for the procuring
or producing of abortion will be done or performed, or how or by what
means conception may be prevented or abortion produced, whether
sealed or unsealed; and
Every paper, writing, advertisement, or representation that any
article, instrument, substance, drug, medicine, or thing may, or can
be used or applied for preventing conception or producing abortion, or
for any indecent or immoral purpose; and
Every description calculated to induce or incite a person to so use or
apply any such article, instrument, substance, drug, medicine or thing -.
18 U.S.C. §1461 (1948).
224 18 U.S.C. §1461 prescribes a fine
of $5,000 and/or five years imprisonment for the first offense, with $10,000 and /or 10 years imprisonment
for each subsequent offense.
225Manual Enterprises, Inc. v. Day, 370 U.S. 478, 483-86 (1962)
(opinion of Harlan, J.) ; see also United States v. Klaw, 350 F.2d 155, 164
(2d Cir. 1965).
226E.g., Roth v. Goldman, 172 F.2d 788 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 337 U.S.
938 (1949).
227 E.g., Walker v. Popenoe, 149 F.2d 511 (D.C. Cir. 1945).
228 See Redmond v. United States, 384 U.S. 264, 265 (1966).
229 433 F.2d 1252 (2d Cir. 1970).
230394 U.S. 557 (1969).
231 See note 240, infra.

See also in direct agreement, United States v.
Lethe, 312 F. Supp. 421 (E.D. Cal. 1970).
232 18 U.S.C. §1462 (1948)
which prohibits the use of common carriers
for1 the
importation or interstate transportation of obscene materials.
18 U.S.C.
§1465 (1948) which prohibits interstate transportation of
obscene materials for sale or distribution. There is a rebuttable presumption
that transporting two or more copies of any publication or a combined total
of five such publications is intended for sale or distribution.
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Packages are inspected

at random and if the material found is deemed obscene by the
inspector, the United States' Attorney is notified. He, in turn,
files for an in rem determination of the protected nature of the
materials in the appropriate federal district court. Movies are
handled in a similar fashion, and with rare exceptions, all are
screened prior to entry. Section 1305 has recently been challenged successfully in United States v. Tlirty-Seven (37) Photographs.234 The court found §1305 unconstitutional in light of
Stanley, for it prohibited importation of obscene material for all
purposes, including 5private viewing, which Stanley holds the Con2
stitution protects.
More consistent with the philosophy underlying Stanley and
other recent decisions 23 6 dealing with private possession of pornography is the Anti-Pandering Act. 23 7 It permits postal patrons

receiving unsolicited erotic material to request the Postmaster
General to issue an order, commanding that the patron's name be
deleted from the mailing list of the person sending the material.
The only basis for determining what is considered "erotically
arousing or sexually provocative," the standard incorporated in
the statute, is the patron's "sole discretion." Therefore, the government can exercise a legitimate interest in protecting an individual from having material, which he finds is offensive, thrust
238
upon him.

STANLEY EXTENDED

Although the government can claim a legitimate interest in
obscenity regulation, it does not extend to all situations. This
2 9
was the basis for the Court's holding in Stanley v. Georgia 3
233

19 U.S.C. §1305 (1948).

309 F. Supp. 36 (D.C. Cal. 1970); probable jurisdiction noted, 39
U.S.L.W. 3146, oral arguments made, 39 U.S.L.W. 3317 (1971).
2.4

23-5309 F. Supp. at 37-38.

In Stanley, Justice Marshall stated that the First Amendment guaranteed the right of an individual "to receive information and ideas" regardless of their social worth. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969).
"The most fundamental premise of our constitutional scheme may be that
every adult bears the freedom to nurture or neglect his own moral and
intellectual growth." United States v. Dellapia, 432 F.2d 1252 (2d Cir. 1970).
27 39 U.S.C. §4009 (1967) which also provides that the addressee may
request the Postmaster General to include in the order the names of any of
his minor children, not yet nineteen, and who reside with the addressee 39
U.S.C. §4009(g) (1967). The constitutionality of this statute was upheld
in Rowan v. Post Office Department, 397 U.S. 728 (1970). Balancing the
right to communicate against the right of privacy the Court stated, "[a]
mailer's right to communicate must stop at the mailbox of an unreceptive
addressee." Id. at 736-37.
238See Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629
(1968), where the court
refused to permit pandering as an intrusion on the public sensibilities;
Redrup v. New York, 386 U.S. 767, 769 (1967), where the Court stated a
special concern for protection against "obtrusive" publication of obscenity and
for regulation of "pandering."
239 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
236
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that mere possession of obscene material cannot constitutionally
2
be made a crime.

40

Under authority of a federal warrant to search Stanley's
home for alleged bookmaking evidence, officers found three reels
24
of eight millimeter film in an upstair's bedroom desk drawer. '
Using a projector and screen the officers found on the premises,
they viewed the films, determined them to be obscene, and arrested Stanley for knowingly having possession of obscene material in violation of Georgia law. 242 The Georgia Supreme
Court affirmed Stanley's conviction,243 holding it "was not essential to an indictment charging one with possession of obscene
material that it be alleged that such possession was 'with intent
to sell, expose or circulate the same'. ' ' z4
On appeal to the United States Supreme Court, the applicant contended that the Georgia statute violated the First and
Fourteenth Amendments because it punished mere private possession of obscene material. 245 The State argued that obscenity
is not within the area of protected speech or press, relying on
Roth.2 4 The Court answered that although Roth seemed to declare without qualification, that obscenity is not within the First
Amendment protection, it did not deal with mere private possesId. at 559.
In a concurring opinion, Mr. Justice Stewart acknowledged the
legality of the officers' presence in Stanley's house and that they acted within
the scope of the warrant when they searched the desk drawer. But he stated
that what they found were cans of film, not gambling material, and under the
warrant there was no authority to seize the filns. He concluded that since
the contents of the films could not be determined from mere inspection, this
was an exploratory search, which violated the Constitution. He reasoned
that to condone this action was equal to permitting the government to use
a legal warrant "as a ticket to get into a man's home, and once inside, to
launch forth upon unconfined searches and indiscriminate seizures ....
Id. at 571-72.
242 GA. CODE ANN. §26-6301 (Supp. 1968), which states in part:
240

241

Any person who shall knowingly ... have possession of ... any obscene
matter . . . shall, if such person has knowledge or reasonably should

know of the obscene nature of such matter, be guilty of a felony ....
242 Stanley v. State, 224 Ga. 259, 260, 161 S.E.2d 309, 310 (1968).
244 Id. at 261, 161 S.E.2d at 311.
246 In Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), the issue was before the
Court, but that case was decided on other grounds. Justice Stewart noted
that he would reverse on the ground that the Ohio statute punishing mere
possession of obscene material was "not 'consistent with the right of free
thought and expression assured against state action by the Fourteenth
Amendment.'" Id. at 672.
In State v. Ohio, 170 Ohio St. 427, 166 N.E.2d 387 (1960), four of
the seven judges felt that criminal prosecution for mere private possession
of obscene materials was prohibited by the Constitution. However, Ohio
law required concurrence of all but one of the judges to declare a law
unconstitutional.
246 Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 560 (1969). The Court noted that
the cases sighted in Roth for support of the assertion that obscenity has
always been considered outside of the sphere of the First Amendment have
dealt primarily with public distribution or use of the mail. Id. at 560-61.
See Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 481 (1957).
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sion of obscene materials. 247 Most prior cases, the Court stated,
28
4
or prosecutions
dealt with prosecutions for sale or distribution,
2 9
4
children.
to
material
for sale of obscene

The Court recognized a valid governmental interest in dealing with obscenity, but held that mere assertion of such an interest cannot in all situations outweigh all constitutional protections. 2

°

The Court reasoned that it is well established that the

Constitution protects the right to receive information and ideas,
Also, the right to be free
regardless of their social worth.23
from unwarranted governmental intrusions into one's privacy,
except in very limited circumstances, is fundamental. 2

2

These,

the Court stated, are the rights that the appellant, Stanley, is asserting - the right to read or observe what he pleases in the
privacy of his own home. 253

Whatever, the justification for other

statutes regulating obscenity4 such reasons do not apply to the
2
privacy of one's own home.

The Court found Georgia's assertion of the right to protect
an individual's mind from the effects of obscenity noble, but
wholly inconsistent with the philosophy of the First Amendment:
"Its guarantee is not confined to the expression of ideas that are
conventional or shared by a majority ....,,255 The Court also
asserted that it is of no relevance that the materials are utterly
devoid of any ideological content, as the line between transmission of ideas and mere entertainment is too elusive to be drawn
22
by the Court, if such a delineation can be made at all. 5

In addressing itself to the effects of obscenity, the Court
held that the State may no more prohibit the mere private pos247 394 U.S. at 660-61 (1969).
248

See Redrup v. New York, 386 U.S. 767 (1967) ; Mishkin v. New York,
383 U.S. 502 (1966); Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463 (1966);
Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184 (1964); Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147
(1959).
249 Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968); cf. Interstate Circuit,
Inc. v. City of Dallas, 390 U.S. 676 (1968).
250 394 U.S. at 563, citing Roth:
Ceaseless vigilance is the watchword to prevent ... erosion [of First
Amendment rights] by Congress or by the States. The door barring
federal and state intrusion into this area cannot be left ajar; it must
be kept tightly closed and opened only the slightest crack necessary to
prevent encroachment upon more important interests. 354 U.S. at 488.
251 Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 143 (1943) ; see Griswold
v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482 (1965); Lamont v. Postmaster General,
381 U.S. 301, 308-09 (1965) (Brennan, J., concurring) ; cf. Pierce v. Society
of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925). See also Winters v. New York, 333 U.S.
507, 510 (1948).
252 See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 483 (1965) ; Olmstead v.
United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting); cf.
NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 462 (1958).
253 Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 565 (1969).
254 Id. at 565.
255 See Kingsley Int'l Pictures Corp. v. Regents, 360 U.S. 684, 688-89
(1959); of. Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495 (1962).
256 394 U.S. at 565.
If the First Amendment means anything, it means that a State has
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session of obscenity on the ground that it may lead to antisocial
behavior than it may ban possession of chemistry books in that
they may lead to homemade manufacture of spirits. 257 The Court
further found no clear and present danger from mere private
2 58
possession of obscenity.
The Court concluded by stating that the decision did not impair the holding in Roth, but that Roth did not extend to mere
possession of obscenity in one's own home.2 5 9 Rather, they indicated that its application is limited to situations of commercial
distribution or public dissemination, where there is the danger
that the obscene materials might fall into the hands of children - 0;
or where it might intrude upon the sensibilities or privacy of the
26 1
general public.
Although the Stanley Court purported to work no fundamental changes in the rationale that supported the decision in
Roth and post-Roth cases, the basis of Stanley necessarily modifies Roth's broad declaration that obscenity is not protected by
the First Amendment. Therefore, where courts would once have
applied the Roth standard and simply dismissed the material as
unprotected, it is now necessary to consider the impact of Stanbe extended to the
ley to determine whether its mandate can
2 62
particular situation under consideration.
In 1969, the United States District Court for the District of
Massachusetts extended Stanley beyond the privacy of the living
room and into the quasi-public atmosphere of a movie theater, restricted to adult patrons in the far-reaching decision of Karalexis
v. Byrne.263 The defendants were indicted, and subsequently conno business telling a man, sitting alone in his house, what books he may
read or what films he may watch. Our whole constitutional heritage
rebels at the thought of giving government the power to control men's

minds.
Id.
257

Id. at 567.

258 Id. at 566.
259
260
261

262

Id. at 568.
Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968).

Redrup v. New York, 386 U.S. 767, 769 (1967).

After Stanley it is necessary to look at each case and accommodate

legitimate, competing interests.

United States v. Dellapia, 433 F.2d 1252,

1255 (2d Cir. 1970), challenging the right to mail in private correspondence
obscene material:
It is no longer accurate to state categorically that the First Amendment

does not protect obscenity.

It is now necessary to inquire beyond the

mere nature of the published matter, and to look into the government's
interest in suppressing it.
Hayes v. Van Hoomissen, 321 F. Supp. 642 (D. Ore. 1970):
"The clear implication [of Stanley] is that orthodox First Amendment
considerations are once again of paramount importance, Roth notwithstand-

ing, even where the publications in issue are concededly 'obscene.'"

United

States v. Various Articles of "Obscene Merchandise", 315 F. Supp. 191,
195 (S.D.N.Y. 1970). See Katz, Privacy and Pornography, 1969 SuP. CT.
REV. 203; Engdahl, Requiem for Roth: Obscenity Doctrine is Changing, 68
MICH. L. Rsv. 185, 198-201 (1969).
268 306 F. Supp. 1363 (D. Mass. 1969).
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victed in violation of the Massachusetts' obscenity law in the
State court for showing the Swedish film, "I Am Curious Yellow," distributed and owned by Grove Press. 264 The District
Court refused to abstain 26 5 and issued a preliminary injunction

against further interference with the showing of the film. It
further forbid initiation of any future prosecutions or execution
of any sentences already imposed by the State Court, pending
a decision on the merits.2

66

The court noted that in the State

proceeding, the lower court applied the Roth standards and
found the picture obscene.2 6 7

But it found that even if the

picture was obscene within the meaning of Roth, it was advertised so that anyone purchasing a ticket would be aware of its
contents. They further found that no pandering in the Ginzburg
sense was involved.
The court then approached the problem directly: "how far
does Stanley go ?"268 First, the court held that Roth cannot stand
in light of Stanley. While Roth held that "implicit in the history
The history of the litigation
264 MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 272, §28A (1968).
is not clear from the district court decision 306 F. Supp. 1363 (D. Mass.
1969). See Byrne v. Karalexis, 396 U.S. 976 (1969), where the Court detailed a chronological account of the case and stayed the temporary injunction
issued by the appellate court.
265 306 F. Supp. 1363 (D. Mass. 1969).
The district court refused to
abstain on the ground that the statute was challenged on its face as a
violation of the right of free speech. Id. at 1367. Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380
U.S. 479, 489-90 (1965), held that abstention would be inappropriate where
a statute is justifiably so challenged. A state statute is "justifiably"
attacked on its face if not susceptible to a state court construction that would
avoid or modify the constitutional question. Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U.S.
241, 248-49 (1967).
The Karalexis court found abstention improper because the Massachusetts statute directly concerned free expression and it was "difficult to
think the Massachusetts statute susceptible to a construction which would
save it from over-broadness." 306 F. Supp. at 1367.
266 The propriety of injunctive relief was governed by Dombrowski v.
Pfister' 380 U.S. 479, 486-89 (1965), where special circumstances existed
which raised a question concerning the good faith of the state officials invoking the criminal process. Dombrowski also stated that it was necessary
to show "irreparable injury" in order to justify the issuance of an injunction
against state proceedings. The Karalexis court found such irreparable
injury:
We do not agree with defendant's contention that there is no indication
of irreparable injury. Even if money damages could be thought in
some cases adequate compensation for delay, this defendant will presumably be immune. We agree with plaintiffs that the box office receipts, if there is a substantial delay, can be expected to be smaller. A
moving picture may well be a diminishing asset. It has been said, also,
that in assessing injury the chilling effect upon the freedom of expression
of others is to be considered.
306 F. Supp. at 1367.
The correctness of this decision was held to be improper. See note 276
infr'a.
The court noted that in Commonwealth v.
267 306 F. Supp. at 1365.
Karalexis it was found that: "the dominant theme of the film ... is its appeal
to prurient interest in sex .... [The film] is patently offensive to the average
person and an affront to community standards ....

redeeming social value." Id. at 1365.
268 306 F. Supp. at 1366.

[It] is utterly without
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of the First Amendment is the rejection of obscenity as utterly
without redeeming social importance, 2 69 Stanley found that it
was irrelevant that the film was "devoid of any ideological con-

tent."2 70 Of more importance, the Karalexis court relied on the
statement of the Stanley Court that obscenity presented no clear
and present danger to the adult or society as a result of exposure
to it.271 Limiting Roth to full public disclosures, the court found
as in Stanley, that the dangers of public distribution, that is, exposure to children and an intrusion upon public sensibilities, were
not present here.2 72 The court held that "restricted distribution,
adequately controlled, is no longer to be condemned. ' 27- They

further found that "[a] constitutional right to receive a communication would seem meaningless if there were no coextensive
''27
right to make it.
4
The court stated that the only logical source
to view the films protected by Stanley was the local exhibitor,
2 7
who would not act at the expense of criminal prosecution. 1
Although the Supreme Court later stayed the District
Court's order and subsequently remanded on grounds of abstention,276 the opinion laid the ground work for subsequent decisions.
Id. at 1366. See Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957).
Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 566 (1969).
271 Karalexis v. Byrne, 306 F. Supp. 1363, 1366 (D. Mass. 1969).
The
test as originally stated required that in order to regulate First Amendment
rights the regulation had to be directly related to a "clear and present danger
that [the expression] will bring about the substantive evils that Congress
has a right to prevent." Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919).
The rule was later liberalized to permit a balancing of the danger against
the right to free speech. Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 510 (1951).
For a discussion of the demise of the test see Strong, Fifty Years of "Clear
and Present Danger," 1969 SuP. CT. REV. 41, and for a critique of the doctrine
see Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment, 72 YALE
L.J. 877, 910-12 (1963). Roth rejected the use of the doctrine for distribution of obscenity was outside protection of the First Amendment. Therefore,
if some obscenity is protected as in Stanley, then this test can control distribution.
272 306 F.
Supp. at 1365. See Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629
(1968).
See generally Krislov, From Ginzburg to Ginsberg, 1968 Sup. CT.
REV. 153.
269
270

273

306 F. Supp. at 1366.

274 306 F.

Supp. at 1366-67. Cf. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479
(1965). In Griswold a Connecticut statute forbade the use of birth control
devises and convictions were sough against the physician prescribing the
devises to married couples. In reversing the conviction, the Court noted
that law prohibiting them from utilizing birth control devices was an unconstitutional invasion of privacy. Id. at 485-86. Since their right to the use
of such devices would be practically meaningless, without the counseling of
a competent physician in its use, the Court held that the advising physician
had standing to challenge the constitutionality of the statute:
The right of freedom of speech and press includes not only the right
to utter or to print, but the right to distribute, the right to receive, the
right to read . . . and freedom of inquiry, freedom of thought, and
freedom to teach .... Without those peripheral rights the specific rights
would be less secure.
Id. at 482-83.
275

306 F. Supp. at 1367.

276

Byrne v. Karalexis, 396 U.S. 976 (1969).

In concurring opinions,
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In Stanley the Court stated unequivocally that individuals
enjoy a constitutional "right to receive information and ideas,

regardless of their social worth.

' 27 7

If an individual has a right

to possess "obscene" materials, as an expression of an idea, then

it would seem to follow logically that he has a right to exchange
27 81
such ideas.
One method of exchange is the mails. However, it is a
criminal violation of 18 UNITED STATES CODE §1461 to use the
Postal System to transport obscene material for any purpose.
In reliance upon Stanley, the Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit in the recent decision of United States v. Dellapia279
placed a new interpretation upon the statute. The defendant had

responded to an ad in a newspaper with a letter offering "real
stag films. .. definitely not to be shown to minors.' ' 2 ° After placing the films in the mail, he was arrested and subsequently convicted for sending obscene material through the mails, in violation of §1461.281 However, the entire transaction was by private
correspondence and the money the defendant received was to

cover out-of-pocket expenses.2 812 The court, after viewing the
films sent by the defendant, found that they were "obscene in
28 4

2' 82
but that since Stanley v. Georgia,
the constitutional sense,
"mere private possession of obscene matter cannot constitutionally be made a crime. ' 285 The court then noted that if the
Supreme Court intended to protect Stanley's right to receive
any impulses his films yielded, it must have intended to extend
some protection to methods for conveying the films to him. By
relying upon the right of privacy that Stanley protects, the court
stated: "[i]t would be anomalous to prevent consenting adults
from freely passing among themselves obscene material which

Justices Black and Stewart criticize the district court for interfering with
a state criminal prosecution. Id. at 982-83. Subsequently, the Court vacated
the judgment of the district court in light of a decision handed down the
same day finding that the district court failed to find a threat to Karalexis'
federally protected rights that cannot be eliminated by "'his defense against
a single criminal prosecution,' Younger v. Harris." Byrne v. Karalexis, 39
U.S.L.W. 4236 4237 (Feb. 23, 1971).
277

394 U.S. at 564.

278 See, e.g., United States v. Sidelko, 248 F. Supp. 813 (M.D. Pa. 1965).
279 433 F.2d 1252 (2d Cir. 1970).
Earl Gerard, in early 1967, and his financee, placed an
280 Id. at 1253.
ad in Swinger's Life, asking to hear from "other photo-collectors and liberalminded
281 couples."
1d. at 1254.
282
Id. The defendant sent a list of movies that he had available, after
a response from Gerard, and then sent him films for $150.00 (which appears
to the court to be payment for out of pocket expenses).
283 Id. The court relied upon Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 190 (1964),
Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 485 (1957), and the Roth restatement
in Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413 (1966) in reaching its decision
on the obscene nature of the material.
284 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
285 433 F.2d 1252, 1255 (2d Cir. 1970).
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Stanley tells us . . . [they are] ...entitled to possess and view
or read." 2 6 Although the court refused to hold the Act unconstitutional, 2? it added the requirement that there must be present
a "valid governmental interest which constitutionally justifies

invasion of a private consensual relationship such as... [present
here] .,1'28
While United States v. Dellapia,289 held §1461 inapplicable
to private correspondence, it has been held applicable to commercial distributions of "adult" literature. In United States v.
Reide,290 the defendant offered for sale in an underground newspaper "imported pornography" to adults only. He was indicted
under §1461 after a postal inspector obtained a $1.00 booklet
from him. 291 The United States District Court for the Central
District of California quashed the indictment relying on Stanley.292 The court found that Stanley meant that individuals can-

not be prevented from such commercial distribution to soliciting
adults, and that §1461 has been erroneously applied.2 9 3 Stanley,
it was argued successfully, protects the right to possess, and such
a right necessarily incorporates the right to send such material
2 94
to an adult who desires it, even by a commercial distributor.
However, the Supreme Court did not agree with the district court's findings and reversed. 2 5 In the second of two ob28
6 Id. at 1258.
Cf. Martin v. Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943). The
Court in a footnote expanded this thought:
We cannot believe that the Supreme Court intended to protect Stanley's
right to receive whatever messages or impulses his films yielded, while
not protecting at least some methods for conveying the films to him. In
a variety of other contexts, the Supreme Court has treated the first
amendment rights to transmit and to receive as cognate. E.g., Lamont
v. Postmaster General, 381 U.S. 301 (1965) (right to receive implies
right to unimpeded delivery by mail) ; Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501,
508-09 (1946) (right to receive implies right to distribute literature on
sidewalk). Cf. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482-83 (1965)
myriad and complementary facets of first amendment protection).
433 F.2d 1252, 1258 and n.25 (2d Cir. 1970).
287 433 F.2d at 1259-60.
288 Id. at 1260.
The court relied upon the previous decisions weakening
the strength of the Act. See notes 225 through 228 supra.
289 433 F.2d 1252 (2d Cir. 1970).
290 39 U.S.L.W. 4523 (May 3, 1971).

291 Id. at 4523.
9
2 2Id. at 4524.
293

Id.

294ld.

Arguing for the appellee, Reidel, Sam Rosenwein of California in
response to a question by Mr. Justice Marshall concerning Roth stated:
If you have a right to possess the material, you have a right to receive
it. There is a right to communicate and the right to communicate to
me means the right to use the mails to communicate, since they are an
accepted form or method of communication.
Id. at 39 U.S.L.W. 3318 (1971).
39 U.S.L.W. at 4525. The Court stated that the district court "ignored
both Roth and the express limitations on the Stanley decision." Id. at 4524.
The lower court had concluded that §1461 was inapplicable when the material
was not directed to children or unwilling adults.
295
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scenity decisions rendered the same day, 296 Justice White, speaking for the majority, found Reidel in the precise circumstances
as those under which Roth was convicted in Roth v. United
States. 29 7 The Court held that Roth was still the law and that
Stanley was inapplicable to commercial distribution. To extend
the reasoning of Stanley to commercial distributions the Court
found would "effectively scuttle Roth, the precise result that the
2'9 8
Stanley opinion abjured.

Reidel was argued before the Supreme Court together with
United States v. Thirty-Seven (37) Photographs,29 1 which challenged the constitutionality of §1305 of the Tariff Act, 00 which
prohibits importation of obscene material. The claimant was
carrying 37 photographs in his luggage from Europe, which were
seized by customs officials upon inspection at the airport. 0 1 In
seeking to enjoin the government from enforcing the statute, he
admitted that some of the photographs were intended for private
use in a commercial sense. They were to be offered for sale to
adults soliciting them in response to an ad. 02 Even though the

defendant intended to distribute the materials commercially, the
District Court found the statute unconstitutional in light of Stanley, for it prohibited importation for all purposes, including private viewing.3 0 3 The court further found the statute constitutionally invalid for failing to meet the procedural requirements
set forth in Freedman v. Maryland,30 because it failed to insure

that any restraint prior to a final judicial determination would
only be for a brief, specified period.

09

296 Reidel was handed down with a companion case United States v.
Thirty-Seven Photographs, 39 U.S.L.W. 4518 (May 3, 1971). See text
accompanying notes 299 through 311 infra.
297 354 U.S. 483 (1957).
Roth dealt with a disseminator of obscene
material. Stanley, however, dealt with a possessor, and the Court, here,
was unwilling to apply the reasoning of Stanley to the Roth situation. 39
U.S.L.W. at 4524.
298 Id. The Court stated that the focus of Stanley was on freedom of
mind and thought. These rights the Court held, are "independently saved
by the Constitution." Stanley, they said, did not seek to protect the disseminator of the material but the recipient.
299 39 U.S.L.W. 4518 (May 3, 1971).
200 19 U.S.C. §1305 (1948).

309 F. Supp. 36 (C.D. Cal. 1970).
Id. at 37. The claimant in seeking to enjoin the government from
enforcing the statute admitted that some of the photographs were to be
incorporated into a book. In oral argument before the Supreme Court the
claimant's attorney stated that the photographs would be distributed under
201
302

"controled circumstances," i.e., when ".

.

. the book was completed it would

be offered, probably through advertising to adults and will probably not be
sold without proof of age." 39 U.S.L.W. 3317, 3318 (Jan. 26, 1971). The
lower court held that Stanley protects "the right to receive if it protects
the right to read." 309 F. Supp. at 37. Cf. Lamont v. Postmaster General,
381 U.S. 301 (1965).
303 309 F. Supp. at 38.
804 380 U.S. 51 (1965).

905 309 F. Supp. at 38. The Court found that under the present statutory
scheme in §1305, long delays prior to judicial determination could result.
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On appeal the Supreme Court agreed with the lower court
that the statute failed to conform to the mandate of Freedman
and as such realized that §1305 (a) was unconstitutional in its
entirety.3 06 Then, in order to save the statute, the Court made a
unique maneuver by writing in the required time limitations:
fourteen days to commence the judicial proceedings with a sixty
day limitation from commencement to conclusion.30 7 The Court
stated that Congress had expressed such an intent,1°8 and that
the Court, itself, possessed "as much expertise as Congress in

determining" the speed with which "prosecutorial and judicial
institutions can, as a practical matter, be expected to function
.... P'30 The Court, as in Reidel, refused to extend Stanley beyond its facts.3 10 The majority held that importation of pornography was prohibited under §1305 (a) for commercial or private
purposes.""
Justice Stewart concurred in the result of the Court but disagreed with the dicta that the government can "seize literary
' ' 12
material intended for the purely private use of the importer.
He then stated:
If the Government can constitutionally take the book away from
...
[the private importer] . . . as he passes through customs,
then I do not understand the meaning of Stanley v. Georgia.... 313
The first amendment they held, does not permit such discretion vested in
customs agents.
306 39 U.S.L.W. at 4521.
Justice Black in his dissent to Reidel stated
that the Court should have affirmed the court's decision upon finding §1305 (a)
invalid according to Freedman. 39 U.S.L.W. at 4527.
307 39 U.S.L.W. at 4521.
The Court determined the length of these
limitations based on lower court cases in which the government had brought
the action within 14 days and concluded within 60 days. The Court then
stated that such time limitations would not impose an undue burden upon
the government. The majority also found that these limitations were not
unduly harsh on importers "engaged in the lengthy process of bringing
goods into this country. . .

."

The Court seemed to ignore the private im-

porter who, travelling abroad, purchases a book for private consumption and
spends merely minutes packing the book in his luggage. See Justice Black's
dissent in Reidel, note 316 infra.
308 39 U.S.L.W. at 4520. The Court relied on statements in the Congressional Record made while the statute was being considered by Congress.
Justice Black noted that these remarks referred to the first draft of the bill
and not the draft finally enacted into law. 39 U.S.L.W. at 4528.
,09 39 U.S.L.W. at 4521. The basis for this usurpation of Congressional
power was the alleged intent discussed in note 308 supra.
310 Id. at 4522. "That the private user under Stanley may not be prosecuted for possession of obscenity in his home does not mean that he is entitled to import it from abroad free from the power of Congress to exclude
noxius articles from commerce."
31 Id. Justice Harlan agreed with the majority that the Court could
rewrite the statute but dissented as to the Court's dicta prohibiting importation for private use. Such a discussion should not be reached as the facts
concern importation for commercial use and "constitutional questions should
be avoided when not necessary to the decision of the case at hand."
312 Id. at 4523.
Justice Marshall in his dissent in Reidel stated that the
government had ample time to protect its valid interest in protecting children,
etc. when the private importer commercially distributes the material. 39
U.S.L.W. at 4526.
19139 U.S.L.W. at 4523. Justice Marshall was particularly disturbed

312
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Justice Black, with whom Justice Douglas joined, vehemently
dissented in both cases.3 14 He found the Court's rewriting of the
statute in Thirty-Seven Photographs "a seizure of legislative
power that

. .

. [the Court] ... simply ... [does] ... not possess

under the Constitution." 315 He felt that by permitting such
lengthy delays as occurred in Thirty-seven Photographs the im-

porter would be at the mercy of the customs agent and coerced
into giving up his First Amendment rights.316

He further stated

that based upon these two decisions, Stanley would only be good
law "when a man writes salacious books in his attic, prints them
37
in his basement, and reads them in his living room." 1
While the majority refused to extend Stanley, it was apparent that to do so would require overruling Roth.318 They
chose instead to usurp legislative power and rewrite the statute
so that it would conform with prior holdings by the Court. However, in a postscript to Reidel, Justice White made it quite apparent that the Court was aware of the "developing sentiment
that adults should have complete freedom to produce, deal in,
possess, and consume whatever communicative materials may
at the Court's suggestion that there was no need to scrutinize the government's behavior since this was a border search. He realized that such a
situation might necessitate some diminution of constitutional protection but
any such reduction must be jealously guarded. 39 U.S.L.W. at 4526.
314 Id. at 4526.
At the outset Justice Black stated his disappointment at
seeing Roth revived. The failure of the Court to adequately act with
obscenity determinations caused Roth's demise, as evidenced by Stanley and
Redrup, he stated. He closed his dissent with the following remarks which
not only expressed his displeasure with the Court's decision, but the Court
itself and particularly its new members, Chief Justice Burger and Justice
Blackmun:
I do not understand why the Court feels so free to abandon previous
precedents protecting the cherished freedoms of press and speech. I
cannot of course believe it is bowing to popular passions and what it
perceives to be the temper of the times. As I have said before, 'Our
Constitution was not written in the sands to be washed away by each
wave of new judges blown in by each successive political wind that brings
new political administrations into temporary power.' Turner v. United
States, 396 U.S. 398, 426 (1970) (BLACK, J., dissenting). In any society
there come times when the public is seized with fear and the importance
of basic freedoms is easily forgotten. I hope, however, 'that in calmer
times, when present pressures, passions, and fears subside, this or some
later Court will restore the First Amendment liberties to the high preferred place where they belong in a free society.' Dennis v. United
States, 341 U.S. 494, 581 (1951) (BLACK, J., dissenting).
Id. at 4529.
315 Id. at 4527. Justice Black noted how conveniently the government
stayed within the limitations set forth by the Majority. Also, he refused
to agree with the Majority's statement that they could not re-write a similar
statute in Blount v. Rizzi, 400 U.S. 410 (1971), as that was the job of Congress. Id. at 419. The Majority stated that in Blount there was lacking
the necessary intent of Congress which was present in this case.
3" Id. at 4529. The Justice stated that a citizen faced with lengthy
delays, high expenses and the need to hire a lawyer would leave the material
at his port of entry and return home.
.17Id. at 4527. Justice Black concluded that by barring importation
for private use at least four members of the Court would overrule Stanley.
318 39 U.S.L.W. at 4524.
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appeal to them..
."19 Restructuring the obscenity laws, he
stated lies with the legislature, and "Roth and like cases pose no
obstacle to such developments."320 He recognized the validity
of decisions which indicated that it is essential to consider valid
governmental interests, which at times may outweigh the individual's rights.821 The courts have consistently recognized a
valid governmental interest in protecting the public against unwarranted attacks upon its sensibilities. However, such a legitimate governmental interest need not be affectuated by extending
the protection of the First Amendment to some obscene publications, and at the same time, denying it to others. Complete constitutional protection for obscene materials, need not result in a
flood of pornography. In Redrup v. New York,3 22 the Supreme
Court set forth guidelines which protect both the purchaser's
right to possess obscene materials, and the non-purchaser's right
to freedom from uninvited confrontations. The decision noted
three factual settings in which otherwise protected materials
might become objectionable: circumstances involving juveniles;
evidence of pandering; and publication of material so as to make
823
it impossible for an unwilling person to avoid exposure to it.
Therefore, the Court found three circumstances in which the
valid governmental interests outweighed the individual's rights
under the First Amendment. This use of the "balancing test"
would place obscenity under the same factual considerations used
in other areas of "protected" speech.32 4 The courts would no
longer be forced to apply the Memoirs test, which the Supreme
Court in Redrup refused to accept as the only standard by which
obscenity could constitutionally be judged. Instead, the courts
could simply look to the factual circumstances of the case and determine: a) the persons to whom the materials were made availa25
ble and b) the methods by which they were offered.
CONCLUSION

It may be concluded with some assurance that out of a sea
of legal confusion a pattern appears to be emerging. Roth v.
319 Id. at 4524-25.
320

Id- at 4525.

The Court shifted the blame for obscenity regulation

onto Congress. Justice White seemed to ignore the fact that this Court was
more than willing to help the legislature, even where it was doubtful as to the
desired result of the legislation. See note 308 supra.
821 See, e.g., Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 567 (1969) ; Redrup v. New
York, 386 U.S. 767 (1967); United States v. bellapia, 433 F.2d 1252 (2d
Cir. 1970).
322 386 U.S. 767 (1967), reheaing denied sub nom. Austin v. Kentucky,

388 U.S. 924 (1967).
828 386 U.S. at 768.
324 E.g., Tinker v. Des Moines, 393 U.S. 503 (1969) ; Schenck v. United
States, 294 U.S. 47 (1919).
825 United States v. 127,295 Copies of Magazines, 295 F. Supp. 1186,
1189 (D. Md. 1968).
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United States 321 was once thought to foreclose all constitutional
protection to obscenity.

However, Stanley v. Georgia 27 miti-

gated its effect by extending First Amendment protection to private possession of obscene material and Freedman v. Maryland328
regulated its effect by requiring adherence to strict procedural
requirements in its application. While the Court in Memoirs
tried to reformulate a standard to prevent infringement upon
sensitive First Amendment rights,3

29

the Justices soon came to

realize that any one standard would be too subjective and too
3
ambiguous to be unequivocably accepted and uniformly applied. 30
Thus, a new concept of obscenity regulation and First Amendment protection emerged, which recognized the right of an individual to privately select his source of intellectual growth, regardless of its nature.
Recent decisions by the Court will now allow a rule to
emerge which will free the courts of the seemingly impossible
task of determining whether an idea which appeals to an interest
in sex is so valueless as to be outside the protection of the Con1
stitution. Stanley v. Georgia33
allows the Court to balance the
interest of the individual's right to receive any ideas, regardless
of their social worth, against state interests of protecting its
youth and adults from unwarranted intrusions upon their sensibilities.3 3 2 Redrup v. New Yark333 clarifies the situations in
which this state interest will take precedence over the individual's
interest: circumstances involving juveniles, situations burdened
with pandering, and publication designed so that an unwilling
34
person cannot avoid exposure to it.A

To secure its legitimate interests, state and federal legislation need only incorporate two factors: 1) a classification of
persons to whom publications may and may not be distributed,
such as minors; and 2) methods of advertising and dissemination
which will not infringe upon the sensitivities of unwilling persons. To insure that the individual's First Amendment rights will
be secure against competing state interests, statutes should also
incorporate an alteration of the Freedman procedural standards :33 a) the burden of proving an encroachment of one or more
of the three Redrup circumstances should rest with the govern354 U.S. 476 (1957).
394 U.S. 557 (1969).
.128 380 U.S. 51 (1965).
329 Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413 (1966).
1 0 See, e.g., United States v. Reidel, 39 U.S.L.W. 4523 (May 3, 1971);
Redrup v. New York, 386 U.S. 767 (1967).
331 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
.926
327

332

Id.

333 386 U.S. 767 (1967).
334 Id.
13-. See text accompanying note 128 supra.
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ment; b) any administrative restraint, prior to a final judicial
determination must be limited to a preservation of the status
quo; and c) any administrative regulation must assure a prompt
judicial determination, in an adversary setting, similar to the
New York statute upheld in Kingsley Books, requiring a hearing
within 24 hours and a finding within two days after the conclusion of the hearing.
The basis for determining the type of material to be regulated by these legislative enactments can be similar to the standard presently found in the Anti-Pandering Act. 38 If the complaining witness, in his "sole discretion" finds the material
"erotically arousing or sexually offensive" and his conclusions
are considered by the judge to be "reasonable," then the jury
may consider the factual setting in which the material appeared. If they conclude that the defendant distributed the material in one of the three Redrup situations, the court can punish
the defendant appropriately.
By use of such limited regulation, governmental interests
will be secure, and the individual's First Amendment rights will
be maintained at a maximum, assuring that the mandates of the
Constitution will be satisfied. More importantly, the injustice resulting from the dilemma started by Roth will be foreclosed.
L. Leonard Lundy

336 39 U.S.C. §4009 (1967). See note 237 supra.

